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1Abstract 
 
Historically, commodity exchanges have been viewed as natural monopolies, not subject 
to competitive forces.  But in recent years, both technology and regulatory changes have allowed 
for competition between rival exchanges in various contracts.  With competition comes the 
regulation of competition.  The traditional method of regulating competition is through court 
adjudication of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  But in regulated industries, antitrust authority must 
be shared in some way with the regulatory authority.  Then, it must be implemented by the 
relevant government entity. 
 
This article will explore the impact of competition on this industry and how the 
exchanges are dealing with the resulting antitrust issues.  Not surprisingly, there have been 
several allegations of anticompetitive activity in violation of the antitrust laws of the United 
States.  Indeed, at least two lawsuits have been filed, and one complaint has been brought to the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).   
 
Here we review the economics of commodity exchanges, and the nature of competition 
between exchanges.  We then examine the new forces for competition in exchanges offering 
commodity contracts.  After this introduction to commodity exchanges, we review the basic 
economic and legal foundations of antitrust law.  We then provide an analysis of antitrust 
mandate of the CFTC and examine the legal doctrine of implied immunity as it applies to the 
CFTC.  Finally, we discuss various types of antitrust cases, and applies these legal and economic 
theories to recent cases  
 
I. Introduction 
 
Historically, commodity exchanges have been viewed as natural monopolies, not subject 
to competitive forces.  But in recent years, both technology and regulatory changes have allowed 
for competition between rival exchanges in various contracts.  With competition comes the 
regulation of competition.  The traditional method of regulating competition is through court 
adjudication of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  But in regulated industries, antitrust authority must 
be shared in some way with the regulatory authority.  Then, it must be implemented by the 
relevant government entity. 
 
This article will explore the impact of competition on this industry and how the 
exchanges are dealing with the resulting antitrust issues.  Not surprisingly, there have been 
several allegations of anticompetitive activity in violation of the antitrust laws of the United 
States.  Indeed, at least two lawsuits have been filed, and one complaint has been brought to the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).  We will discuss these three cases below. 
 
In Section II of this paper we review the economics of commodity exchanges, and the 
nature of competition between exchanges.  Section III examines the new forces for competition 
in exchanges offering commodity contracts.  In Section IV, we review the basic economic and 
legal foundations of antitrust law.  Section V provides an analysis of antitrust mandate of the 
CFTC and examines the legal doctrine of implied immunity as it applies to the CFTC.  Section 
2VI discusses various types of antitrust cases, and applies these legal and economic theories to the 
recent cases of United States Futures Exchange, L.L.C. v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago 
and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, No. 1:04cv6756 (N.D. Illinois), New York Mercantile 
Exchange  v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., No. 02-Civ-9277 (S.D.N.Y.) and Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange Rule 432.D Interpretation, Submission No. 04-61a – challenge by the 
London International Financial Futures Exchange before the CFTC.1 Section VII contains our 
conclusions. 
 
II. An Introduction to the Economics of Commodity Exchanges 
 
Any discussion of antitrust issues between commodity exchanges requires a discussion of 
what role commodity exchanges play in the economy, how such exchanges operate, and the 
implications those factors have on competition between exchanges.  In this section we will 
review these topics. 
 
A. What do Commodity Exchanges Do? 
 
Commodity exchanges trade contracts, generally known as “derivatives.”  Derivatives are 
generally divided into two categories, “futures” and “options.”  Futures contracts are promises to 
deliver economic goods (generally agricultural products or financial claims) at a fixed price, 
place and point in the future.  Options represent the opportunity to buy or sell products at a fixed 
price at a fixed time and place in the future.2
Derivative contracts exist to reduce risk to economic participants.  In a classic context, 
imagine a farmer who is planting wheat in the spring for harvest in the fall.  This farmer does not 
know what the price of wheat will be in the fall, and therefore, absent a futures contract, is 
engaged in a highly risky endeavor.  If, however, that farmer can sell (“go short”) a futures 
contract on her crop for a fixed price for, say, a fall delivery, then that farmer can alleviate the 
 
1 The following abbreviations will be used for the exchanges: United States Futures Exchange, L.L.C (“Eurex US”), 
Board of Trade of the City of Chicago (“CBOT”), Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”), 
IntercontinentalExchange, Inc. (“ICE”), New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”) and the London International 
Financial Futures Exchange (“LIFFE”).  As additional exchanges are mentioned in this article, the respective 
abbreviations will be noted in the text. 
2 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (“In the 19th century the practice of 
trading in futures contracts led to the development of recognized exchanges or boards of trade. At such exchanges 
standardized agreements covering specific quantities of graded agricultural commodities to be delivered during 
specified months in the future were bought and sold pursuant to rules developed by the traders themselves. 
Necessarily the commodities subject to such contracts were fungible. For an active market in the contracts to 
develop, it also was essential that the contracts themselves be fungible. The exchanges therefore developed standard 
terms describing the quantity and quality of the commodity, the time and place of delivery, and the method of 
payment; the only variable was price. The purchase or sale of a futures contract on an exchange is therefore 
motivated by a single factor -- the opportunity to make a profit (or to minimize the risk of loss) from a change in the 
market price.”); see also What is a Futures Exchange? http://www.cme.com/edu/course/intro/whtfutrx9699.html (A 
futures exchange, legally known in the U.S. as a “designated contract market,” is, at its core, an auction market – 
highly regulated, technical and complex – but an auction market nonetheless. A futures exchange is the only place 
where futures and options on futures (which offer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an underlying 
futures contract at a particular price) can be traded. Trading may take place either on the exchange’s trading floor or 
via an electronic trading platform); Todd Lofton Getting Started in Futures 13-22 (1997); Jim Rogers Hot 
Commodities 61-94 (2004). 
3price risk to farming.   Similarly, one can imagine how a baker who uses wheat would face a 
similar problem in planning its fall operations.  This baker would alleviate his price risk on 
wheat by buying (“going long”).3 In trading terminology, such a contract, between two 
economic parties, is called a “forward.”4
For our hypothetical farmer and baker, however, creating this forward contract may not 
be easy.  The seller of the contract (the farmer) and the buyer (the baker) must be able to find out 
the existence of each other.  But, perhaps, even worse, they must be assured that the other will 
not renege on their agreements.  For example, assume that our farmer and baker agree to a fall 
contract that would have the baker buy the wheat from the farmer at $3.00 a bushel.  If, in the 
fall, the price of wheat is $8.00 a bushel, the farmer has strong incentives to renege on the deal 
and sell her wheat elsewhere.  The baker may have little recourse against the farmer’s action. 
 
Herein lies the role of the commodity exchange.  A commodity exchange creates a 
standardized contract, a “future” (or “option”) for a particular derivative.  Such a contract 
describes the product involved, the time of delivery or expiration, and has attached to it variety 
of financial conditions designed to deter contract default.  Contracts of market participants are 
with the exchange, rather than with each other.  Thus, on an exchange, when a farmer sells a 
future to a baker, each party has a contract, not with each other, but with the exchange.  The 
exchange then guarantees payment on each contract to the contract holders.  Thus, instead of the 
farmer having an obligation to the baker, as in the forward contract, through a futures contract, 
the exchange has an obligation to the baker.   
 
The fact that the exchange holds one side of each contract obligation has an important 
feature.  It serves to make contracts fungible.  Assume, for example, that our farmer wishes to 
eliminate her short position in wheat.  Without a commodity exchange, she would have to go 
back to the baker and renegotiate.  In our exchange world, however, there is no such 
requirement.  Instead, the farmer can eliminate her short position on the exchange by simply 
buying (again, “going long”) a contract equal in size to her short position.  This eliminates her 
obligation with the exchange. 
 
Thus, exchanges, by creating futures contracts, enable derivatives to be traded at low 
cost.  They create standard contract conditions, which reduces contracting costs.  Exchanges act 
as contract guarantors, which enables parties to make trades with assurance that the promised 
payoffs will actually occur.  By having contracts of participants be with the exchange, exchanges 
make such contracts fungible, and therefore “liquid.” In addition, exchanges act as central 
locations for trading of particular contracts.  Thus, if our farmer wants to go long or short in a 
wheat contract, she knows where to look for a party to take the other side of the contract.    
 
Because the exchange holds the contract with both parties, the exchange must take great 
efforts to insure that neither party reneges with it.  This process is known as “clearing,” through 
institutions known as “clearinghouses.” 
 
3 For an in depth discussion of why firms use derivatives, see Geczy, Minton, and Schrand, Why Firms Use 
Currency Derivatives,” 52 Journal of Finance 1323 (1997). 
4 The discussion in this section is taken from Chance, An Introduction to Derivatives and Risk Management, 270-
278 (2004). 
4Clearinghouses essentially perform the financial processing that constitutes the 
mechanics of exchange transactions. They confirm that each trade is acknowledged, settle the 
amounts owed, and ensure the financial integrity of the futures and options contracts traded on 
the exchanges by taking over the counterparty risk and guaranteeing that all contracts will clear 
on the date of performance. These services reduce the credit risk exposure of buyers and sellers 
and allow the exchanges to operate more efficiently.  Commodity exchanges are required under 
the Commodity Exchange Act to have a clearinghouse in place prior to approval as a Designated 
Contract Market.5
The implicit assumption in our discussion so far has been that many or most derivative 
contracts would be held until there expiration.  This is, in fact, generally not the case. In fact, the 
vast majority of contracts are closed out before they reach expiration.6 The reason for this is that 
firms’ risk exposure changes constantly, implying that their desired position in various derivative 
contracts will also change constantly. 
 
Commodities bought and sold on exchanges are not (generally) delivered.  Rather, longs 
and shorts cash out their positions prior to the delivery (settlement) date.  This increases the 
importance of clearinghouse operations to exchanges. 
 
For example, assume on September 1 Party 1 buys 1000 units of natural gas, deliverable 
on October 1, at a price of $4 per unit.  By September 20, October 1 natural gas has fallen to 
$3.25 per unit.  Party 1 decides to cash out of its position, losing 1000*$0.75, or $750.  
 
In the commodities world, however, Party 1 does not pay $4 per unit up front, and take a 
loss of $0.75 on September 20.  Rather, each party’s position is “marked to market” each day.  
For example, assume on September 3 the price of natural gas fell $0.10 per unit.  The 
clearinghouse would then take 1000*$0.10, or $100 from Party 1’s account at the exchange. 
 
Marking to market is done to avoid credit problems at an exchange.  Rather than parties 
who have losses paying them all upon settlement, parties pay losses as they occur, thus reducing 
the daily financial exposure.  (Parties who cannot meet their daily obligations have their 
positions closed.)  This process reduces the financial exposes of the exchange on a daily basis, 
and therefore reduces the threat of insolvency through customer default to the exchange. 
Historically, in the U.S., there have been three important commodity exchanges.  All of 
the “big three” initially started in agricultural products and eventually migrated to more complex 
financial instruments.  For example, the first exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade (“CBOT”) 
historically specialized in grains (corn, soybeans, wheat, oats, etc.).7 However, over the past 
twenty years, the CBOT has diversified its product set moving into, among other things, 
Treasury futures (it’s biggest money maker), as well as metals and stock indices (Dow Jones 
 
5 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(11)(Financial Integrity of Contracts traded on a futures exchange). 
6 See, for example, Hull, Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives (2003, 5th ed.) at 20. 
7 See www.cbot.com; Bob Tamarkin The Merc: The Emergence of a Global Financial Powerhouse 11-12 
(1993)(hereinafter “The Merc”) 
5indices).8 The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”) initially started as the Butter and Egg 
Board, but evolved with a specialty in “meats” (pork bellies, live cattle, lean hogs, etc.).9 Similar 
to CBOT, the CME has also moved into a diverse group of products including stock indices 
(S&P and NASDAQ indices), interest rate products (Eurodollars), as well as foreign currency.10 
Finally, the New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”) traded a variety of products through 
its 132 year history, including potatoes, but it is now focused on energy and metals products, 
such as crude oil, natural gas and gold.11 
B. In Exchanges, Liquidity is King 
 
The need to change positions, and the resulting desire to cash out position, constantly 
generates a tremendous desire by contract participants for “liquidity.”  As Harris puts it, 
“liquidity is the ability to trade large size quickly, at low cost, when you want to trade. It is the 
most important characteristic of well-functioning markets.”12 
Harris (at 398) breaks down liquidity into three components: 
 
1) Immediacy – how quickly you can make trades of a given size at a given cost; 
2) Width – the cost of making a trade of a given size; 
3) Depth – the size of the trade that can be arranged at a given cost.  
 
At this point, a reference to “order books” may be appropriate.  Order books are the 
standing “limit orders” (outstanding offers) to buy or sell a given contract at a given time.13 Let 
us assume that the order book to buy wheat futures looks as outlined in Table 1, below. 
 
Table 1 
Hypothetical Order Book to Buy Fall Wheat Future 
 
Price (per bushel) Order Size (in contracts) 
$3.00 100 
$2.96 200 
$2.94 150 
$2.93 50 
$2.91 100 
Assume that our hypothetical baker would like to reduce his “long” position in wheat by 
selling 400 contracts.  At this moment in time, the baker could sell 400 contracts – but at what 
may be a substantial price slippage.  Selling 400 contracts would require selling 100 at a price of 
$3.00, 200 at a price of $2.96, and 100 at a price of $2.94.    This represents a price slippage of 
six cents from the “top” of the order book.  The amount of the slippage is governed by the 
 
8 www.cbot.com 
9 See www.cme.com; see generally The Merc 
10 www.cme.com 
11 See www.nymex.com 
12 Harris, Trading and Exchanges (2003) 394. 
13 Today, the order books for most well-traded stocks are easily available from Yahoo.com, among other sources. 
6“width” or the order book – how much is offered at a particular price, and the “depth” – what 
prices are available. 
 
Alternatively, our baker could wait for better prices.  He could place a “limit order” to sell 
his 400 contracts at a price of, say $3.05.  How long the baker could expect to wait to have his 
order filled (if it is filled at all) is what Harris refers to as “immediacy.”  Immediacy is important, 
because as risk changes, firms do not wish to caught holding their (previously optimal) 
portfolios. 
 
All these factors – immediacy, depth, and width – are a function of the number of traders 
involved in a particular market.  The more traders, the more limit orders on the order book, the 
wider and deeper the market, the less the price slippage.  If the trader decides to wait for a better 
price, the more traders, the faster that trader is likely to get his requested price. 
 
This adds up to the following:  the more trades, the greater the volume, the “thicker” the 
order book, the more immediate the transactions, the more liquid the market.  Thus, as a market 
gets larger, its value to traders improves.  This has important consequences for the nature of 
competition between exchanges. 
 
C. Competition For the Market  
 
Thus, in commodity markets, bigger really is better.  Thus, if one exchange wants to 
offer, for example, a new wheat contract to compete with the existing wheat contract, it has a 
serious problem getting established. 
 
Contracts have a variety of product attributes – such as (i) what commodity is being 
traded; (ii) what size of the commodity constitutes a contract; (iii) what type of price movement 
is allowed for the contract, which corresponds to the economic value of the contract (i.e., how 
much value is associated with a “tick”); (iv) where is the contract cleared; (v) what is the margin 
required to trade the product; (vi) what are the price limits for the contracts (daily highs & lows); 
(vii) what reporting levels are in place for the contract (known as “Large Trader Reporting” that 
requires traders who hold certain large positions to report such positions to the CFTC); and (viii) 
how is the product traded – open outcry, i.e., “in the pits,” or electronically through either 
dedicated networks and/or the Internet.14 But the crucial aspects of any contract are liquidity and 
 
14 The transition from open outcry to electronic trading is not always an easy process.  Electronic 
trading is considered more transparent, efficient and cheap as compared to open outcry.  
However, despite the obvious business reasons for such a transition to electronic trading, there 
are imbedded interests in open outcry that stall electronic progress.  The lack of transparency and 
efficiency is to the benefit of the traders who stand “in the pits.”  That is, they are able to respond 
to market forces “in person” before anyone that trades outside of the exchange, e.g., a trader who 
has to “call in” orders to a broker (who then, in turn, trades on behalf of the client). See generally 
http://www.ftmandate.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/851/The_man_versus_machine_debate.html.  
In an interview with one of the authors regarding the transition to electronic trading in the Brent 
Crude Oil contract at the International Petroleum Exchange (“IPE”), a trader working for a large 
oil company stated that he/she did not want to see the IPE “go electronic” because the company 
7the benefits that come from liquidity.  For this attribute, it is near impossible for a new contract 
to have the product quality of the existing contract in the same product.  Further, it is very 
difficult for two competing contracts to survive in the long run. 
 
Thus, what competition between contracts offered by different exchanges really amounts 
to is competition for the market.15 If exchange can compete effectively for markets, in the long 
run, the contract with the best product attributes will survive.  Competitively, the operators of 
that contract will be constrained, not by existing rivals, but by “potential” competitors – firms 
that could enter the market if the incumbent attempts to exercise market power.  It is this type of 
competition, competition for the market, that antitrust in commodity exchanges is largely 
concerned with.  This, in turn, implies that the creation of barriers to entry for new competitors 
will be at the center of antitrust claims in this area. 
 
III.  New Forces for Competition Between Exchanges 
 
With the advent of new technology, globalization, as well as the passage of a flexible 
regulatory scheme in 2000, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”), significant 
competition at the exchange level has, for the first time in the history of the derivatives industry 
in the United States, been introduced.  These three forces reduced – but certainly did not 
diminish – barriers to entry in becoming an exchange. 
 
A. “Let’s be Gentlemen” – The Rules of Exchange Competition Prior to the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 
 
Competition at futures exchange in the United States has been described by market 
observers as “historically mild.”16 As has been traditionally the case: 
 
…[t]he Chicago exchanges have competed in the past over new products, with 
one market eventually emerging as the dominant market, and the other market 
relinquishing that listing as a result.  CBOT trades the mini-Eurodollar, which 
competes with the CME.  But the competition between the two exchanges has 
generally been healthy and good-natured.17 
liked the control it had over the market when it was run as open outcry.  Further, he/she stated 
that the company feared that they democratization that electronic trading would bring to the 
market.  This, in turn, would hurt the company’s interests and ability to control the market.  We 
note, however, that one argument against electronic exchanges is that they are prone to “fat 
finger” errors where a trader mistakenly trades a far larger amount than he or she intended.   See, 
for example Pratap Ravindran, “’Fat finger' trades are not aberrations, The Hindu Business 
Report, January 8, 2006, www.blonnet.com/2006/01/08/stories/2006010803190500.htm. 
15 See Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, Journal of Law and Economics (1968) and Baumol, Contestable Markets 
and the Theory of Industry Structure (1982). 
16 “U.S. Futures Markets: The Chicago Trifecta,” Celent Communications at 6 (2004). 
17 Id. at 8 
8Put more bluntly by other commentators, the exchanges entered into an implicit 
“gentlemen’s agreement,” whereby they agreed to not compete in each other’s dominate markets.  
As one commentator has put it: 
 
The Chicago Merc and CBOT are thriving, in part, by following a sort of 
gentlemen’s agreement to respect each other’s traditional business turf.  The 
CBOT specializes in futures contracts tied to such storable commodities as corn 
and soybeans, as well as long-term interest rates.  The Chicago Merc specializes 
in perishable commodities such as live cattle and hogs, as well as in short-term 
interest rates.18 
This “respect for competition” has led to the development of exchange franchises in 
successful contracts.  That is, once a product gains traction and all-important liquidity, other 
exchanges in the United States have not pursued the contract.  While one could assume that a 
“gentlemen’s agreement” to leave each other’s turf alone is at work and responsible for the lack 
of competition in these successful contracts, it is equally possible that once a contract is 
successful, “stealing” such contract from the incumbent exchange is viewed as a difficult, and 
perhaps nearly impossible, task.  Thus, competing exchanges decide that they would rather invest 
their resources elsewhere.19 As stated by John Damgard, Chairman of the Futures Industry 
Association, a long-time derivatives trade group: 
 
Traditionally, once a market achieved liquidity and dominance in a particular 
product, no challenger emerged.  Traditionally, trading and clearing were 
inextricably linked, one function supported the other and shut out potential 
competitors that might want to offer similar services.  In fact, traditionally, few 
markets even attempted to challenge dominant markets by offering a new contract 
design, method of trading or clearing efficiency.20 
Nonetheless, exchanges in the United States readily compete on new products.  That said, 
new products rarely succeed and the product development process at most exchanges can best be 
described as a “crapshoot.”21 While the exchanges typically have large research and product 
 
18 Darryl Van Duch, “Regulators Say Chicago’s Two Big Exchanges are Slow to Self-Police.  They Say the Feds are 
Missing it,” The National Law Journal A1 (December 18, 1995).  See also John P. Caskey, “The Philadelphia Stock 
Exchange: Adapting to Survive in Changing Markets,” Harvard Business History Review at 12-13 (October 1, 2004) 
(discussing alleged gentlemen’s agreements between option exchanges to list the others’ options for trading, which 
led to a lawsuit being pursued by the U.S. Department of Justice). 
19 Not surprisingly, at least one high ranking official from a U.S. exchange, the CBOT, believes that U.S. exchanges 
face significant competition: “I am known for being blunt.  So let me put this bluntly.  Those who would tell you 
that U.S. futures exchanges are monopolies and face no competition are out of touch with reality.  There is more 
competition today than ever before,” Testimony of Charles P. Carey, Chairman of the Chicago Board of Trade 
Before the Subcommittee on General Farm Commodities and Risk Management of the House Agriculture 
Committee, June 19, 2003. 
20 Testimony of John M. Damgard, President, Futures Industry Association Before the House Subcommittee on 
General Farm Commodities and Risk Management, Committee on Agriculture, March 9, 2005. 
21 An example of the successful nature of product development is the development of energy futures by the New 
York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”) in 1978.  “Exchanges: Growth and Change the Ongoing Story; Commodity 
Exchanges; 20 Years of Futures,” Futures at 52 (March 1992).  At the time of the development of energy futures, it 
9development departments, creating new, successful contracts is very challenging.  Many new 
ideas are thrown at the dartboard, and most fail.   
 
An example of this dartboard development techniqueof new product competition 
occurred in early 2000, when both the CME and the CBOT decided to launch “agency-note” 
futures that were linked to debt issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.22 The exchanges 
launched these competing products at the same time – during the second week of February in 
2000.23 CME won the initial liquidity battle over CBOT, thanks in part to an aggressive 
incentive program.  The combined Note products traded almost 12,000 contracts on the Merc 
during their debut.  However, volume quickly fell thereafter and the CBOT seemed to take 
control of the fledgling contracts when it posted open interest of 12,800 contracts and volume of 
13,300 two weeks after the launch of the agency note product.24 Thereafter, trader and 
institutional interest in these contracts on both exchanges faded and the contracts ended up in the 
massive graveyard of tried, but unsuccessful, futures products.25 
B.  Enter Competition – The Commodity Futures Modernization Act Becomes 
Law 
 
Congress passed, and President Clinton signed into law, the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act (“CFMA”) in late 2000.26 Indeed, the bill became law literally in the 
“eleventh hour,” passing right before the 106th Congress adjourned for the session.27 In the 
preamble of the bill, Congress made it explicit that “enhanc[ing] competition” in the markets for 
futures and over-the-counter derivatives was a goal of the legislation.28 One of the ways the 
CFMA set out to achieve competition in the marketplace was to promulgate “core principles” as 
a way to regulate exchanges and clearinghouses, rather than using traditional, overly proscriptive 
rules.29 In other words, the new law created a flexible regulatory scheme for market participants.  
As such, Congress hoped that U.S. exchanges could compete more effectively internationally, as 
 
was unclear if the NYMEX would survive as it was “reeling” from potato futures default and manipulation problems 
in the late 1970s.  Id.; See also Paul Meier, “Derivatives – History and Outlook,” February 13, 2003. 
22 Peter A McKay, “Chicago’s Two Major Futures Markets Launch Rival ‘Agency-Note’ Offerings,” Wall Street 
Journal, Section C at 25 (April 3, 2000). 
23 Meredith Grossman, “Open Interest, Volume of CBOT’s 10-Year Agency Notes Bypass Merc,” Chicago Tribune, 
Business Section at 5 (March 31, 2000). 
24 Id.
25 There are many reasons why a new futures contract will not succeed.  One of the most reasonable explanations is 
that there is not an end customer need for the product.  In other words, while the “locals” trading in the pits (as 
speculators) at the exchanges in the United States can support a new contract by trading with each other for a period 
of time, eventually, in order to succeed, the contract must appeal to some end-user base that needs to use the contract 
for hedging purposes.  The entry of end-users into the marketplace is sometimes referred to as getting “customer 
paper” into the trading mix (or, more bluntly, finding “food” for the market).  Without the customer paper, the 
product cannot survive.  Stated slightly different, without hedgers, the speculators can only last so long and the 
contract will die. 
26 Commodity Futures Modernization Act, Appendix E of P.L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (December 14, 
2000)(hereinafter “CFMA”). 
27 Richard A. Miller, “Introducing the Commodity Futures Modernization Act,” Futures and Derivatives Law Report
at 1 (December 2000). 
28 CFMA (preamble). 
29 Id. at § 2. 
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well as that new entrants would be encouraged to compete in the marketplace given the “lighter” 
regulatory regime. 
 
Furthermore, the CFMA provided for one specific core principle that addressed antitrust 
issues as they relate to exchanges: 
 
ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS. – Unless necessary or appropriate to achieve 
the purposes of this Act, [a] board of trade shall endeavor to avoid – 
 
(A) adopting any rules or taking any actions that result in any 
unreasonable restraints of trade; or 
 
(B) imposing any material anticompetitive burden in trading on the 
contract market.30 
Despite a limited legislative history, in subsequent Congressional testimony, many 
legislators, regulators and industry participants have hailed the CFMA as pro-competition 
legislation.  For example, Acting Chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Sharon 
Brown-Hruska, stated: 
 
Prior to the CFMA, the market was regulated with a one-size-fits-all 
model.  It did not matter whether a customer was commercially sophisticated; 
whether the underlying commodity was susceptible to manipulation; whether a 
customer needed the flexibility of an over-the-counter contract or the liquidity of 
an exchange-traded one; or whether there was more than one way to deliver 
customer protections in the marketplace.  This recognition by Congress of these 
differences represented a significant step forward in its design of the regulatory 
oversight structure.  When Congress adopted the CFMA, it put in place a 
practical, principles-based model and gave the CFTC the tools to regulate markets 
that were challenged by competition brought about by technology and an 
increasingly global marketplace. 
 
* * *
…the innovation, competition, and customer choice envisioned by Congress in 
passing the CFMA is bearing fruit.31 
As Acting Chair Brown-Hruska noted in her testimony, the CFMA has indeed borne 
fruit.  From 2000 through 2004, the volume of futures and options contracts traded on U.S. 
 
30 Commodity Exchange Act, Section 5(d)(18), 7 U.S.C.§ 7(d)(18).  This core principle was based on pre-existing 
antitrust language contained in the Commodity Exchange Act. 
31 Testimony of Sharon Brown-Hruska, Acting Chairman Commodity Futures Trading Commission Before the 
House Subcommittee on General Farm Commodities and Risk Management, Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House 
of Representatives, March 3, 2005 (hereinafter “Brown-Hruska Testimony”). 
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exchanges increased from 600 million contracts a year to over 1.6 billion contracts per year.32 
The product range also increased dramatically going from 266 to 556 regulated contracts.  
Furthermore, and perhaps most significant from a competitive vantage, the CFTC approved eight 
new Designated Contract Markets (futures and options exchanges).33 Finally, eleven Exempt 
Commercial Markets34 and three Exempt Boards of Trade filed notifications with the 
Commission indicating that they were open for business.35 
The initial wave of competition after the passage of the CFMA swept the derivatives 
industry.  There was unprecedented competition at all levels of the industry – among the 
regulated exchanges, in the over-the-counter versus the regulated exchanges, and even between 
clearing houses.  Some of the competition included: 
 
-- Exchange Place Futures Exchange, LLC, also known as “Brokertec Futures 
Exchange,” a joint venture of several of the largest investment banks, was formed 
in 2001.  It listed futures and options on futures electronically in the Treasury 
(fixed income) complex of contracts competing directly against the Chicago 
Board of Trade; 
 
-- Several online energy exchanges emerged to compete with the incumbent 
regulated futures exchange, the New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”), as 
well as with over-the-counter “voice brokers.”  These new, Internet-based 
exchanges included: Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) (notice given to CFTC in  
2001), Houston Street (notice given to CFTC in 2002), TradeSpark (notice given 
to CFTC in 2002), Natural Gas Exchange (notice given to CFTC in 2002), 
Optionable (notice given to CFTC in 2001), Spectron Live.com Limited (notice 
given to CFTC in 2003), as well as Altrade and Red Meteor;36 
-- A new clearinghouse, EnergyClear, a joint venture of the Bank of New York, as 
well as energy voice brokers Prebon Yamane and Amerex, was created in 2000 
(and approved by the CFTC as a Derivatives Clearing Organization in 2001) to 
offer netting and settlement of wholesale energy contracts for the over-the-counter 
marketplace in competition with the NYMEX clearinghouse, as well as the 
London Clearinghouse.37 
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 An “Exempt Commercial Market” is a marketplace that is exempt from most, but not all, provisions of the 
Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations.  In order to qualify as an Exempt Commercial Market, such 
market must not allow “retail” customers to trade on it.  That is, the market is only usable by large, typically 
institutional, users.  See generally Section 2(h) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)  and 17 CFR 
§ 36.3 (Exempt commercial markets). 
35 Brown-Hruska Testimony. 
36 Richard Stavros, “e-Commerce Collusion?  The Trustbusters Take Aim; the Federal Trade Commission likely will 
regulate those business-to-business Web portals, but how much?,” Public Utilities Fortnightly at 48 (September 1, 
2000); see also http://www.cftc.gov/dea/dea_ecm_table.htm. 
37 “Bank of New York Joins with Two Over-The-Counter Energy Brokers,” Foster Natural Gas Report at 21 
(December 7, 2000); see also http://www.cftc.gov/dea/dearegistered_dco.htm. 
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-- A regulated futures exchange, the St. Louis Merchants Exchange was formed 
(again) in 2000 to offer the same energy contracts as NYMEX.38 
-- U.S. Futures Exchange, LLC, also known as “Eurex US,” was approved by the 
CFTC as a Designated Contract Market (“DCM”) in 2004.  Eurex US listed 
futures and options on futures in the Treasury complex of contracts competing 
directly against the Chicago Board of Trade.39 
-- Eurex US also listed foreign exchange (“FX”) products in competition with the 
CME, as well as the New York Board of Trade on September 23, 2005.40 
-- CBOE Futures Exchange, LLC (“CFE”) was approved by the CFTC in 2003 as a 
DCM.  CFE’s primary product is volatility indexes, which compete largely 
against the CME.41 
-- Eurex US and CFE separately listed the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 Index 
products in 2005 in direct competition with the CME and the New York Board of 
Trade. 
 
The entry of these new competitors led to competition among the long-time, established 
exchanges.  The legacy exchanges “took their gloves off” and began competing against each 
other in “franchise” products for the first time in history, with one notable exception.42 For 
example: 
 
-- The CBOT listed precious metal products (gold and silver) in direct competition 
with NYMEX’s metal exchange subsidiary, the Comex, beginning on October 6, 
2004.43 
-- Euronext-Liffe, a non-CFTC registered exchange, but a foreign futures exchange 
authorized to do business in the United States under CFTC regulations, offered 
Eurodollar contracts – the flagship product of the CME – in 2004 through its 
electronic trading system.44 
38 Ann E. Berg, “Does the Futures Industry Need Revamping?,” Futures at 62-66 (May 2003); 
39 See http://www.cftc.gov/dea/deadcms_table.htm (hereinafter “CFTC Designation Table”) 
40 http://www.eurexus.com/about/company_info/press_releases/eurex_us_news_pressreleases_415.html 
41 CFTC Designation Table; see also http://www.cboe.com/publish/CFEinfocirc/CFEIC04-
011.pdf#search='cme%20cboe%20lawsuit%20s%26p' (describing litigation between CME and CBOE regarding 
licenses to S&P products). 
42 This exception involves the competition over the Bund contract between DTB/Eurex and Liffe in 1997.  This 
competition is discussed below. 
43 http://www.cbot.com/cbot/pub/cont_detail/0,3206,1027+23668,00.html 
44 http://www.strategicsinc.com/content/press/press_Euro.html (“LIFFE to list Global Eurodollar Contract from 18 
March”). 
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-- CBOT listed German interest rate products in direct competition with Eurex AG, 
based out of Frankfurt, Germany, in 2004.45 
-- NYMEX listed the Brent Crude Oil contract in direct competition with the 
International Petroleum Exchange (“IPE”) in 2001 (immediately before 
September 11, 2001) and then again in 2004.46 
-- The IPE indicated that is would list the West Texas Intermediate (“WTI”, the 
most important type of oil produced in the United States) oil contract in direct 
competition with NYMEX on February 2, 2006.47 Similar to Euronext-Liffe, the 
IPE is a foreign futures exchange that operates in the United States pursuant to a 
no-action letter issued by the CFTC.48 
Accordingly, to the extent Congress sought to increase competitive activity by passing 
the CFMA, the Act was a huge success.  However, has any of the competitive activity actual 
resulted in success by the competing exchange?  Moreover, have consumers of the exchange 
products realized any long-term benefits as a result of the increased competitive activity?  In 
other words, did the CFMA lead to “real” competition? 
 
C. The Results of Competition Five Years After Passage of the CFMA – With 
Few Exceptions, the Incumbents Are Winning in a Landslide 
 
An exchange with a captive clearinghouse is “one of the largest de facto 
monopolies on earth.  We do not have a competitive environment right now.  
Instead, we have exchanges that are each monopolies in their own products.  And 
customers don’t thrive under monopolies.”49 
While the competition statistics from the CFMA appear, on their face, to paint a positive 
story, the actual competitive results of competition between exchanges have been much less 
impressive.  With a couple of limited exceptions, none of these new exchanges have been able to 
break into the liquidity held by the legacy exchanges.  Indeed, while the CFTC has touted the 
statistics concerning new exchanges seeking designation with the CFTC post-CFMA, the 
statistics relating to exchanges either closing shop or ceasing trading are equally revealing.  
According to CFTC materials, nine exchanges shut their proverbial doors since passage of the 
CFMA (as compared to eight that were approved post-CFMA).50 
Moreover, challenges to the “core” products of the existing exchanges have not 
succeeded.  For example, after failing to attain any meaningful market share in the treasury 
 
45 http://www.cbot.com/cbot/pub/cont_detail/0,3206,1123+18742,00.html  (“On April 23, 2004, the CBOT will 
launch Bund, Bobl, and Schatz futures on the e-cbot platform, with seven firms serving as market makers within the 
German debt complex.”). 
46 http://www.nymex.com/notice_to_member.aspx?id=ntm210&archive=2001;    
http://www.nymex.com/notice_to_member.aspx?id=ntm398&archive=2004 
47 https://www.theice.com/showpr.jhtml?id=1240 
48 http://www.cftc.gov/tm/letters/03letters/tm03-17.htm 
49 “Clearing Firms and Exchanges at Odds at CFTC Clearing Roundtable,” Securities Week at 1 (August 5, 2002). 
50 CFTC Designation Table. 
14
market against CBOT, Broker Tec Futures was purchased by Eurex US.51 While Eurex US had 
more success than Broker Tec, it was unable to break CBOT’s monopoly on the treasury 
products.  Indeed, in June 2005, Eurex US announced that it had effectively given up the fight 
against CBOT. 52 Eurex US claimed that a significant reason for its inability to gain traction in 
the product was CBOT’s alleged anticompetitive activity, which is the subject of a pending 
antitrust lawsuit (and discussed below).53 
Other results of the post-CFMA competition are: 
 
-- EnergyClear ceased operations on July 9, 2004.54 
-- Merchants Exchange ceased operations on September 30, 2004.55 
-- CFE has failed to gain any meaningful market share on any of its products, 
typically trading less than 5,000 contracts a day.56 
-- In early 2005 Eurex US took between four to eight percent of the market share in 
the Russell contract, but it has had to waive fees and pay “market makers” to do 
so.57 
-- CBOT’s foray into precious metals in competition with NYMEX/COMEX has 
shown the most promise of all the efforts to take on an established product.  While 
CBOT’s  market share was is in the 1-2 percent range for quite some time, it 
seemed to hit a “tipping point” in late 2005 where its market share jump to a 
steady 10 percent.58 More recently, CBOT’s market share in gold has risen to 44 
percent.59 
51 http://www.pricegroup.com/newsletter/062405.htm 
52 Natasha de Teran, “Eurex Throws in the Towel Over U.S. Treasuries,” eFinancial News, June 17, 2005 
53 Id.
54 http://www.cftc.gov/dea/dearegistered_dco.htm?from=home&page=epclearingcontent 
55 CFTC Designation Table. 
56 http://cfe.cboe.com/AboutCFE/ShowDocument.aspx?DIR=ACNews&FILE=20060601.doc 
57 http://www.eurexus.com/about/company_info/press_releases/eurex_us_news_pressreleases_394.html (“Eurex US 
is waiving all trading fees for all market participants for the first three months of trading in the Russell products. 
Twenty-two firms are acting as market makers for the new products and are providing additional liquidity and 
increasing order book depth by continuously quoting prices and offering competitive spreads. Market makers will be 
active during the core U.S. trading hours (8:30 am to 3:00pm CST)”).  “Market makers” are speculators who 
continuously offer to both buy and sell the relevant contract.  See Harris, supra, 195.  
58 http://www.cbot.com/cbot/pub/cont_detail/0,3206,1027+35861,00.html?link=rss  (“After celebrating the one-year 
anniversary of launching its Precious Metals complex electronically, the CBOT marked another major milestone, 
with its Gold contracts (100 oz. and mini-sized futures) capturing a 15 percent market share of gold futures traded in 
North America based on volume for the month of December. Daily volume for the overall complex reached a record 
in December, surpassing 20,000 contracts in a single session.”) 
59 David Roeder CBOT pan for profits, Chicago Sun-Times, July 21, 2006 at 47. 
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-- Euronext.Liffe failed to attract any significant liquidity to its Eurodollar contract 
and, as such, on, Euronext-Liffe acknowledged that it was going to give up the 
battle of the Eurodollar.60 
-- CBOT has failed in its efforts to trade the core European fixed income products 
from Eurex.  Indeed, the contracts failed after having no trading activity.61 
-- Finally, despite incentive programs that pay traders up to $200,000 a month, 
NYMEX has not attracted any significant volume in its efforts to take the Brent 
crude oil contract from IPE.  With limited exceptions, its volume is in the 3-5 
percent range of total Brent contracts.62 
The results of post-CFMA competition, or lack thereof, have not escaped industry 
observers.  As noted in 2005 by Jeremy Grant, a long-time futures industry reporter for the 
Financial Times:
[T]o put it mildly, none of these initiatives has lived up to expectations.  Eurex 
US’s share of the Treasury futures market is still under 5 per cent, with Euronext-
Liffe scraping by on a Eurodollar share of roughly 2 per cent.  The CBOT has 
barely made a dent on NYMEX.  And the CBOT’s Bund, Bobl and Schatz 
initiative has sunk without trace. 
 
* * *
The CBOT’s initiative stands out because it is an example of an electronically 
traded offering competing against an existing “open outcry” traded product. That 
reinforces the view that it is where liquidity resides that counts, not the way 
products are traded…  The real barrier to stealing liquidity and thus successfully 
competing is the difficulty of shifting open interest from one clearing house to 
another.63 
Indeed, the challenge of moving (or, as incumbents often describe it, “stealing”) open interest to 
the challengers’ products was a central issue in the CME/LIFFE matter, discussed below. 
 
Furthermore, while many industry observers have noted the positive effects of 
competition on the marketplace even though such competition has “not been successful in doing 
more than chipping away at the entrenched markets’ dominance,”64 recent moves by the legacy 
exchanges suggest that such positive effects may be short-lived.  For example, after sensing that 
the competitive threat from Eurex US was receding (and, that a hefty Eurex US incentive 
 
60 John J. Lothian Profits soar for Euronext, Newsletter (August 31, 2005)(“Euronext.liffe let is be known during 
their press conference …that they will be scaling back their investment in Eurodollars.  They will be winding down 
the contracts.”) 
61 The CBOT delisted these products on August 17, 2005. See http://www.cftc.gov/submissions/subdcms0805.htm 
62 http://www.nymexeurope.co.uk/notice_to_member.aspx?id=ntm02&archive=2005 
63 Jeremy Grant, “An Era of  Derivatives Competition that Never Was,” Financial Times, March 14, 2005 at ___. 
64 Testimony of John M. Damgard, President Futures Industry Association before the Subcommittee on General 
Farm Commodities and Risk Management, Committee on Agriculture, House of Representatives, March 9, 2005. 
16
program expired), the CBOT raised fees on its treasury products.65 Additionally, the CME 
announced that it would raise fees for its members effective August 1, 2005.  Notably, CME’s 
stock price rose 6 percent on the announcement prehaps because it was able to demonstrate its 
pricing power in the market.66 
D. Defeating the Incumbents Requires a “Perfect Storm” 
As discuss above, in commodity markets, “liquidity is king.”  The result has been that 
commodity markets are often insulated from competition.  As put by one observer:  
 
Stock exchanges are often revered as bastions of free markets, but the reality is 
that virtually all of them have been adept at squashing competition from anyone 
who would challenge their privileged position.  Ever since the first stock 
exchange was founded in Amsterdam in 1611, these bodies have been owned by 
brokers who control the trading on the floor and make sure their interests are 
taken care of first.67 
Liquidity has also been called a “black hole,” sucking up everything in its path: 
 
[T]he liquidity generated by the [new trading] system will start drawing in more 
and more buyers and sellers, not unlike a black hole.68 
So, the question raised is whether a market, once it obtains a critical mass of liquidity in a 
product (and thus becomes a monopoly in such product), can ever lose such liquidity.  The most 
prominent, and perhaps only example of such an event was the so-called “Battle of the Bund.”  
In the 1990s, Liffe had established the bund contract as a crucial cornerstone in its portfolio of 
products.  Indeed, it was (and is) one of the most heavily traded derivatives contracts in the 
world.  Deutsche Terminboerse (“DTB”), the predecessor to Eurex,69 set its sights on the Bund 
contract.  Given that Liffe was trading the contract via open outcry and DTB was a fully 
electronic exchange, DTB thought that it had an opportunity to capture the contract due to the 
structural differences in the trading environment.  Moreover, given the fact that the Bund was 
(and is) a German product, DTB believed that it could appeal to German banks on a nationalist 
 
65 http://216.109.125.130/search/cache?p=cbot+fee+raise+treasury&fr=FP-tab-web-t402&toggle=1&ei=UTF-
8&u=tradetalk.cbot.com/cbot/pub/cont_detail/0%2C3206%2C1236+32360%2C00.html&w=cbot+fee+raise+treasur
y&d=NtiDnTmtM_J-&icp=1&.intl=us (“The exchange fee rate increase implemented October 1, 2005 is currently 
expected to raise the overall rate per contract in the fourth quarter of 2005 about seven to ten percent from the rate 
during the third quarter of 2005”) 
66 www.cme.com/files/feechanges.pdf;.
67 Gregory Dalton, “The Killer B-to-Bs,” The Industry Standard, February 28, 2000.  See also “Six Southeast 
Wholesalers Join New Intercontinental Energy Exchange,” Platts Southeast Power Report, August 4, 2000 at 4 
(“’Liquidity is King’ in determining whether … online exchanges will be successful…”); Hoi Leung, “Futures 
Exchange Takes a Hard Line on Various Issues,” Hong Kong Standard, December 28, 1998 (“In all of these 
markets, liquidity is king… Once the liquidity is there, it will be a long term threat to [the dominant marketplace]”).   
68 Dan Bogler, “Net Deal aims to Trap More Trades: Technology Electronic Share Trading,” The Financial Times, 
August 27, 1998 at 16. 
69 Eurex was the result of a merger between Deutsche Terminboerse and the Swiss Options and Financial Futures 
Exchange in 1998.  Lee Oliver, “CBOT Facing Tough Challenge,” eFinancial News, March 14, 2004. 
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level to assist in their effort.  Ultimately, while the battle lasted seven years,70 DTB succeeded in 
taking the Bund contract from Liffe.  As described by industry commentator, Patrick Young, the 
tipping point occurred in 1997: 
 
For years, Liffe had dominated the [Bund] market.  By March 1997, the DTB had 
managed to capture only a very paltry share of 35 percent of Bund futures trading.  
In April, this creaked up to 37.5 percent but after six years of head-to-head 
contest, progress was hardly significant.  Then as 1997 progressed, volume began 
to drift upwards on the DTB.  It wasn’t a passive situation, the Frankfurt 
management had made a no-holds-barred attempt to coax the business away from 
the London market.  Turnover reached 43 percent in July 1997 when trading 
hours were extended by 90 minutes… The major catalyst, however was the 
Maastricht Agreement which guaranteed free trade throughout the European 
Union.  Amongst the treaty’s many provisions, one permitted any European 
marketplace’s terminals to be sited anywhere within the other European nations.   
 
* * *
By September 1997, the gloves were off and the knuckle dusters on in the 
fight for market share in the Bund… Exchange or clearing fees were waived at 
both the DTB and Liffe. 
 
* * *
By October, Liffe’s share of the Bund business was down to 52 percent.  
However, the DTB’s policy of disseminating their screens far and wide [] was 
beginning to pay off in terms of volume growth – and more significantly market 
share.  
 
* * *
The full frontal assault on Liffe’s Bund business went ballistic on January 1st,
1998.  The DTB dropped up-front admission and annual membership fees for full 
members and market makers, and slashed those for clearing members.  
Telecommunication line fees were also dropped, replaced by a minimum 
transaction fee of DEM 4,500 per month. 
 
On Wednesday October 22nd 1997, the turning point had been reached.  
The DTB surpassed Liffe’s Bund market share with 52 percent of that day’s 
volume.  From then on, the Germans never looked back.71 
In analyzing the battle for the Bund, it is reasonable to conclude that DTB was able to 
take advantage of the dislocation created in the market by the differences in trading systems, i.e., 
Liffe was open-outcry and DTB was electronic.  Additionally, a change in European regulation 
 
70 Id. 
71 Patrick Young, The New Capital Market Revolution (2003) 52-55. 
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(the Maastrich Agreement), contributed to this dislocation and created an opportunity for DTB to 
distribute its trading system far and wide.  Moreover, DTB put significant resources behind this 
effort.  Thus, the “last leg of the stool” in taking the Bund was money – DTB bought the 
liquidity by not charging traders fees for trading its Bund contract.  The battle for the Bund 
therefore resulted in a “perfect storm,” allowing for the transfer of liquidity. 
 
In more recent times – post-CFMA – there have been (and are) dislocations that could 
result in additional liquidity transfers.  For example, when Eurex entered the US market and 
competed with CBOT in the market for Treasury derivatives, there were various factors that led 
one to believe that Eurex had an opportunity to create another “perfect storm,” including: 
 
-- CBOT was in the process of changing its trading system from the Deutsche-
Boerse created “ACE system” (ACE meaning “Alliance between Chicago Board 
of Trade and Eurex) to the Liffe Connect product, thus requiring its traders to go 
through a complicated change in technology; 
 
-- CBOT was also in the process of changing its clearing house from The Board of 
Trade Clearing Corp (“BOTCC”) to the CME clearing house.  Again, this 
changeover required the cooperation and execution on the part of a number of 
parties, including the CFTC to “bless” the transfer of the open interest in treasury 
from BOTCC to CME.  It was Eurex’s desire that it the open interest would 
remain at BOTCC.  Had the CFTC supported that view, the battle of the treasuries 
would, quite likely, have turned out differently. 
 
-- Given that one of Eurex’s parent organizations, Deutsche Boerse, was the owner 
of the ACE system, Eurex US was able to easily utilize this technology once 
CBOT changed systems.  Thus, Eurex US had a built in trading system with 
distribution to key traders. 
 
-- Eurex invested significant funds into the treasury product – including $18 million 
in 2004 in market making and other trading incentives – to attempt to attract 
liquidity to its platform.72 
As noted above, however, Eurex did not prevail in this battle and recently announced a 
retreat.  Eurex asserts that one of the crucial reasons for its inability to win this market was due 
to illegal anticompetitive activity on the part of CME and CBOT.  It has filed an antitrust lawsuit 
alleging such claims.  This lawsuit is discussed infra in Section ___. 
 
The other crucial market dislocations that could lead to liquidity transfers post-CFMA 
relate to NYMEX because it is one of the few remaining bastions of open-outcry in the world.  
More specifically, the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”), an all-electronic OTC energy trading 
platform, has made inroads with the NYMEX natural gas contract, as well as NYMEX’s West 
Texas Intermediate oil contract.  As of October 2005, ICE has approximately 35 percent of the 
 
72 http://www.eurexus.com/about/company_info/press_releases/eurex_us_news_pressreleases_334.html 
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cleared market for Henry Hub natural gas.73 With respect to the WTI oil contract (ICE is using 
its UK-based futures subsidiary to list WTI), ICE has captured approximately 15-20 percent of 
the market within the first few weeks of listing the contract.74 
Additionally, as noted above, CBOT has listed precious metals contracts (gold and silver) 
on its electronic trading system in competition with the COMEX division of NYMEX.  Thus, 
similar to the DTB-Liffe battle, an open outcry model is being challenged by an electronic 
model.  CBOT has made significant inroads into the gold product, obtaining 50 percent of the 
market as of June 2006.75 
Finally, in an ironic twist of the open outcry-electronic battles, NYMEX is attempting to 
take liquidity from the IPE in the Brent Oil contract by attacking IPE from an open outcry model.  
IPE took the Brent Oil contract fully electronic in April  2005.  NYMEX saw an opportunity to 
attempt to tap into the disgruntled open outcry traders who were going to lose their jobs.  As 
such, NYMEX opened an open outcry exchange in Ireland and tried, through extremely generous 
incentive programs, to attract these traders to the pits in Ireland.  Thus far, the Brent battle has 
not borne fruit for NYMEX.  
 
In summary, while the CFMA, combined with technological advancements, have led to 
competition in the futures and options marketplace at the exchange level, there have not been any 
significant success stories.  One crucial reason for this failure is that existing liquidity creates a 
very high barrier to entry.  This, in turn, implies that the alleged creation of further barriers to 
entry will be central to antitrust concerns in this area. 
 
IV. Basic Economic and Antitrust Principles 
 
A. The Economic Goals of Antitrust 
 
Exchanges may now be open to competition.  But that competition may take a different 
form than the competition, say, between local gasoline stations.  Exchange competition, as 
discussed above, appears to be competition “for the market.”  Thus, antitrust policy should seek 
to allow that competition to occur, allowing the most efficient firm to succeed in the market, and 
for the benefits of that efficiency to be passed on to consumers. 
 
The recognized goals of antitrust vary slightly, but we will start here with the premise 
that the goal of antitrust is to maximize the net economic wealth for society, by facilitating the 
provision of goods with higher quality and lower costs.76 The goal of antitrust, therefore, is 
explicitly not to protect incumbent firms and their (presumed) supra-competitive prices. 
 
73 In its S-1 Registration Statement filed with the SEC in October 2005, ICE reports that it has average daily volume 
in its Henry Hub over-the-counter cleared natural gas contract of 29,000 contracts.  NYMEX has average daily 
volume in its Henry Hub over-the-counter cleared  natural gas contract of 8,000 contracts and 75,000 average daily 
volume in its cleared Henry Hub futures contract.  Thus, adding NYMEX’s cleared contracts (its OTC and futures 
contracts) compared to ICE’s OTC contract, implies that ICE’s overall percentage is approximately 35 percent. 
74 https://www.theice.com/showpr.jhtml?id=2960 
75 http://www.cbot.com/cbot/pub/cont_detail/0,3206,1036+39436,00.html 
76 [“..the only goal of antitrust law should be to promote efficiency in the economic sense…” Posner at 2].   
20
B.  The Rule of Reason and the Basic Elements on an Antitrust Case 
 
The antitrust cases we will discuss here are “rule of reason” cases.  The rule of reason 
dates back to the Supreme Court decision in Standard Oil v. United States.77 It requires for 
liability a logically consistent economic theory of anticompetitive harm, with the evidence to 
support that theory.   
 
Any antitrust case required two elements: 1) a concentrated antitrust market; and 2) 
barriers to entry into that market.78 
1.  Market Definition 
Any monopolization attempt must refer to the actions of a firm that is “dominant” in an 
“antitrust market.”  Measures of “dominance” can vary, but following U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of 
America (ALCOA),79 66 percent market share is generally considered sufficient to show 
dominance. 
 
Defining an antitrust market, especially in a monopolization case, can be a far more 
daunting task.  In general, there are always substitute for an economic product.  For example, one 
can gain the same financial exposure from a share of stock by being long in a call with an 
exercise price equal to the stock price, and short in a put with the same exercise price.80 But that 
does not mean that a call/put package is in the same antitrust market as the stock.  The 
transactions costs from acquiring the call/put combination can be significantly greater than the 
transactions costs of simply acquiring the stock.  In the case of Eurodollars, a product traded at 
the CME, one can acquire the same exposure by, for example, by going long or short in a variety 
of short-term interest rate products. 
 
An antitrust market has two dimensions: product and geographic (though here we will 
focus on the product market dimension).  The United States Department of Justice/Federal Trade 
Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines state for product market definition:  
 
[T]he Agency will delineate the product market to be a product or 
group of products such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm 
that was the only present and future seller of those products 
("monopolist") likely would impose at least a "small but significant 
and nontransitory" increase in price. That is, assuming that buyers 
likely would respond to an increase in price for a tentatively 
identified product group only by shifting to other products, what 
would happen? If the alternatives were, in the aggregate, 
sufficiently attractive at their existing terms of sale, an attempt to 
raise prices would result in a reduction of sales large enough that 
 
77 221 U.S. 1 (1911) 
78 Id. 
79 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) 
80 See, for example, at Hull, supra, at 174-5. 
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the price increase would not prove profitable, and the tentatively 
identified product group would prove to be too narrow.81 
In simpler terms, a group of firms is considered to be an antitrust market if they can raise 
their price a small but significant amount (perhaps 5 percent) without losing a significant number 
of customers.  With respect to commodities exchanges and the Eurodollar contract, this analysis 
comes down to a question of if all exchanges who traded Eurodollars jointly raised their fees 5 
percent, would a significant number of customers switch to other instruments. 
 
The difficulty with this approach is that it applies to mergers, not monopolization cases.  
Using this market definition in a monopolization case risks falling into the famous “Cellophane 
trap.”82 Assume, for example, that apples and oranges are in separate antitrust markets, and each 
constitutes the others’ “nearest” competitor.  If a firm is able to monopolize the apples market, it 
will raise the price of apples so that they are now substitutes with oranges.  Thus, using the 
Merger Guidelines approach, a small increase in the price of apples would result in customers 
switching to oranges.  Thus, the Merger Guidelines test would conclude that apples and oranges 
were in the same antitrust market, and fail to detect the possibility of monopolization. 
 
There is no definitive method of avoiding the Cellophane trap.  In commodity exchange 
cases, however, we would look to see what competitive threats the relevant exchange has faced 
in the past for its contract.  If those threats have consisted solely of other entities threatening to 
establish contracts in the same product, such a situation would be a sufficient (but not necessary) 
condition for establishing the product as an antitrust market.  If such a condition is not met, 
defining the relevant antitrust market may become problematic.83 
Another approach to this question was presented in FTC v. Staples.84 In this matter, the 
FTC sued to prevent Staples from buying its rival Office Max.  The relevant product market 
asserted by the FTC was something along the lines of “office superstores.”85 Such a market 
definition was counter-intuitive, to say the least.  Consumers can and do buy office supplies 
through a number of other distribution channels. 
 
The crucial evidence for the FTC, however, was data that indicated that Staples’ and 
Office Max’s prices were between 5 and 13 percent higher in markets where one firm did not 
compete with another.  In effect, this evidence subsumed the entire Merger Guidelines test.  
Since prices were higher where the two firms did not compete, eliminating the competition 
between the two firms via merger would increase prices to consumers. 
 
81 http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm.  The geographic approach is similar.   
82 Named after the product at issue in the famous antitrust case, U.S. vs. Dupont, 351 U.S. 391 (1954).  
83 But see Discussion of CME/LIFFE, supra.
84 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (D.D.C. 1997) 
85 More precisely, from the court decision, “[t]he Commission defines the relevant product market as "the sale of 
consumable office supplies through office superstores,"  with "consumable" meaning  products that consumers buy 
recurrently, i.e., items which "get used up" or discarded. For example, under the Commission's definition, 
"consumable office supplies" would not include capital goods such as computers, fax machines, and other business 
machines, or office furniture, but does include such products as paper, pens, file folders, post-it notes, computer 
disks, and toner cartridges.” 
22
Since exchange antitrust markets, if they can be defined on a product by product basis 
(which may often be appropriate), are likely to have one incumbent and one entrant, they are 
therefore likely to be considered concentrated. 
 
2. Barriers to Entry 
 
Simply having a monopoly in an antitrust market is not sufficient to exercise market 
power.  To exercise market power, a firm must be protected by a barrier to entry – something 
that stops entry from occurring once the monopoly firm charges supra-competitive prices. 
 
A variety of authors over the last 35 years have proposed a number of definitions of 
barrier to entry.86 Unfortunately, these definitions have not been entirely consistent.  A recent 
article by McAfee, Mialon and Willians87 brings these definitions into focus in a tractable 
fashion that can be used in antitrust analysis.  They break barriers to entry into economic and 
antitrust barriers, where the first is a subset of the second. 
 
McAfee et. al. begin by defining an economic barrier to entry.  An economic barrier to 
entry, “is a cost that must be incurred by a new entrant that incumbents do not or have not had to 
incur.”  For example, the CME has been trading commodities since the late 1800’s.88 Assume 
that because of new regulation, any new competitor must gain regulatory approval from the 
federal government, and the approval process is onerous and uncertain.  This would constitute 
both an economic barrier to entry and an antitrust barrier to entry. 
 
McAfee et. al. then go on to define an antitrust barrier to entry as “a cost that delays 
entry, and therefore reduces social welfare relative to immediate but costly entry.”89 The process 
of operationalizing this definition is a bit involved, but what it comes down to is a combination 
of sunk costs, economies of scale, and uncertainty. 
 
Sunk costs refer to costs that, once borne by the entrant, cannot be recouped by the 
entrant should that firm decide to exit the market.90 For example, if a firm decides to enter the 
automotive industry, it will have to build a manufacturer plant.   If the firm then decides to exit 
the automobile business, it has on its hands a plant which may not be very valuable in other 
economic uses.  The firm has therefore “sunk” costs into its facility as a condition of entry. 
 
Economies of scale are also important.  If a firm can enter a market at a very small scale, 
its sunk costs are likely to be small, and any resulting potential losses from exiting the market are 
also likely to be small.  Thus, if a firm can compete effectively by selling one percent of the 
product in a particular market, antitrust barriers are likely to be low.  If, on the other hand, to be 
successful a firm has to compete for the entire market, it raises the possibility of significant entry 
barriers. 
 
86 See, e.g.,, Bain, Barriers to New Competition (1956), Ferguson, Advertising and Competition (1974), and Carlton 
and Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization (1994). 
87 McAfee, Mialon, and Williams, What is a Barrier to Entry?, American Economic Review, 94:2 (2004) 461-465.  
88 The Merc 
89 McAfee, et. al. supra.
90 See Baumol and Willing, Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers, and Sustainability of Monopoly, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 96:3 (1981) 405-31. 
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The final ingredient is uncertainty.  Ex ante, it is often not very clear whether or not a 
potential entrant will be successful.  If there is no such uncertainty, there is no risk from sinking 
costs, and therefore no barrier to entry. 
 
Recent economic literature has cited the barrier to entry properties of network 
industries.91 A network industry can be described as having a product that is more valuable the 
more people use it.  The telephone is a classic network product.  A telephone owned by one 
person is useless by itself.  Only if another person owns a telephone, and there are lines in 
between, is the first telephone useful.   
 
Now assume a third person obtains a telephone and gets “linked” to the network.  The 
phones of the first two telephone users now become more valuable, as they can use their 
telephones to reach the third person.  This process continues as more people buy telephones. 
 
The result is that local telephone networks, absent switching (a very modern event) are 
natural monopolies.  As one telephone system gets large, it becomes more valuable and its rivals’ 
systems become less valuable.92 
Network economics played a starring role in the recent Microsoft case.93 According to 
the theory of the case, as Microsoft’s operating Windows system became more and more 
dominant, more and more software developers created their products to be compatible with 
Windows.  This made it harder and harder for other operating systems to get into the market. 
 
Futures and commodity exchange platforms fit the definition of network industries.  The 
more trades and traders on a particular exchange, the more liquidity on that exchange, the more 
able the exchange is to serve the needs of its customers. As more traders trade, they are able to 
execute their trade more quickly, and get better prices for their trades 
 
This, in turn, has several implications.  First, consistent with the discussion in Section II, 
it implies that competition in any commodity exchange market is competition for the (entire) 
market.94 In effect, the firms are competing for the right to be the monopolist, or “winner take 
all.”  Consumers are served by this process by having the most efficient firm winning the 
competition for the market. 
 
The market for a network good, by definition, is difficult to enter.  By definition, upon 
entry the entrant’s good is inferior to the product of the established firm.  Thus, the basic method 
for the entrant to gain customers is to “buy” or “rent” them – either by directly paying them to 
 
91 The classic articles on network economics are Katz and Shapiro, “Network Externalities, Competition, and 
Compatibility,” American Economic Review, 75 (3), 424-40 (1985), David (1985), “Clio and the Economics of 
QWERTY,” American Economic Review, 75 (2) 332-7 (1985), and Liebowitz and Margolis, “The Fable of the 
Keys,” Journal of Law and Economics, 33(1) 1-25 (1990). 
92 This externality effects serves as the rationale for subsidizing universal service, which attempts to get as many 
people as possible in society hooked up to the telephone network. 
93 See, for example, Lopatka and Page, “Antitrust on the Internet: Microsoft and the Law and Economics of 
Exclusion 7 Supreme Court Economic Review 157 (1999). 
94 See Demsetz , "Why Regulate Utilities?," Journal of Law and Economics 11(1) 55-65 (1968). 
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switch products or by offering their product for an extremely low price.95 As the discussion 
above in Section II indicates, new entrants in this industry have had very little success 
overcoming the relevant barriers to entry.  In fact, commodity markets are notoriously “tippy,” 
with competition often being for the market, rather than in the market.  This increases the 
importance of economies of scale, and of any artificial barriers to entry incumbents might create.  
 
C. Antitrust and Economics: Summary  
 
Under a rule of reason, an antitrust plaintiff must have a theory of how consumers have 
been or are likely to be injured. Any antitrust plaintiff must have a well defined market that is 
(allegedly) being monopolized.  That market must also have a barrier entry – or else even a 
monopolist could not charge supra-competitive prices.  But for a commodity exchange antitrust 
case to be successful, it needs something else.  It needs to find a court willing to listen to it.   For 
such a plaintiff, this may be the most significant obstacle of all.   We turn to that difficult 
question next. 
 
V. Antitrust Jurisdiction and Immunity in Regulated Industries – Can Parties Get to 
Court? 
 
In all regulated industries, the regulator has responsibility for at least some of the 
industry’s competitive practices.  This sets up a potential conflict between the regulator’s actions 
and the court-determined antitrust law.  Thus, for a plaintiff in a regulated industry to get to 
court, it must first show that the court has jurisdiction.  Unfortunately, there is a good deal of 
tension in the law on this issue.   
 
The critical issue here relates to the doctrine of Implied Repeal of, or Implied Immunity 
from, the antitrust laws,96 as well as the doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction.97 Simply put, these 
doctrines determine, in the first instance, whether a plaintiff can go to court with an antitrust 
claim in the context of a “regulated industry,” whether the plaintiff must pursue the matter before 
the federal agency overseeing the regulated industry, or whether the issue is immune from the 
antitrust laws altogether. 
 
In this section we will first review the major jurisdiction on this issue.  We will then 
comment on what we believe the appropriate law should be.  As we will describe, this is a line of 
cases that started well, but is in danger of “falling off the tracks.”  We will then review the recent 
history of CFTC antitrust jurisdiction.  
 
95 One of several articles discussing “buying customers” in an antitrust context is Kleit and Coate, Are Judges 
Leading Economic Theory?: Sunk Costs, the Threat of Entry, and the Competitive Process, Southern Economic 
Journal 60:1 (July 1993) 103-118. 
96 See, e.g., Philip F. Johnson, Antitrust in the Commodities Field: After Gordon, 6 Hofstra L. Rev. 115 
(1977)(discussing inter alia the application of  Silver and Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659 (1975) 
in the commodities field)(hereinafter “After Gordon”). 
97 Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289, 303 (1973). 
25
A. A Brief History of the World – of Implied Immunity and Primary 
Jurisdiction 
 
The seminal case in this area is Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.98 While Silver 
involved an antitrust challenge in the context of the securities industry, its ruling has been 
equally relied upon in the commodities area.99 In Silver, the plaintiff, Harold Silver, operated a 
securities firm, Municipal Securities, Inc. to trade in corporate over-the-counter securities.100 
Because communication with the marketplace and, in particular, obtaining market data was (and 
is) of great importance in trading activities, Silver, who was not a member of the New York 
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), arranged to have direct private telephone wire connections with 
members of the NYSE.  While the NYSE originally approved of the connections, it later 
rescinded its decision and cut-off Silver’s connection to the important securities trading data.101 
Silver brought the action alleging, inter alia, violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.  
The case went to the Supreme Court on the issue of “whether the Securities Exchange Act has 
created a duty of exchange self-regulation so pervasive as to constitute an implied repealer of our 
antitrust laws, thereby exempting the Exchange from liability in this and similar cases.”102 
The Silver Court began its analysis by noting the difficulty in reconciling the pursuit of 
eliminating antitrust restraints with the important duties of self-regulation imposed on exchanges.  
Such self-regulation inevitably, at times, conflicts with the objectives of the antitrust laws.103 
Nonetheless, the Court held that, despite the NYSE’s “general power to adopt rules governing its 
members’ relations with nonmembers,” it was not exempted from the antitrust laws.104 The 
Court made clear that: 
 
The Securities Exchange Act contains no express exemption from the antitrust 
laws or, for that matter, from any other statute.  This means that any repealer of 
the antitrust laws must be discerned as a matter of implication, and “it is a 
cardinal principle of construction that repeals by implication are not favored.”  
[citations omitted].  Repeal is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make 
the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the minimum extent 
necessary.105 
As noted in the academic literature, Silver articulated a basic two-part test for implied 
repeal: 
 
Immunity made be predicated upon either (1) a finding that the administration of 
the regulatory statute is incompatible with the maintenance of private antitrust 
suites (statutory incompatibility); or (2) the defense that the activity’s competitive 
 
98 373 U.S. 341 (1963). 
99 See, e.g., Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289, 303 (1973)(discussing Silver). 
100 Silver, 373 U.S. at 343-44. 
101 Id.
102 Id. at 347. 
103 Id. at 349. 
104 Id. at 357. 
105 Id.
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impact, in the absence of direct agency oversight, is the minimum necessary to 
fulfill self-regulatory duties under the regulatory statute (“rule of reason”).106 
Although there was a comprehensive regulatory framework in place, there was no direct 
securities regulation that addressed the telephone issue in Silver. Accordingly, the Court found 
that the defense of Implied Immunity failed.107 
The next significant decision in the “get to court” area involved the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (“CME”), Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange.108 While the Silver Implied 
Immunity doctrine was reviewed, the decision ultimately turned on the issue of Primary 
Jurisdiction.  That is, the Court examined whether, given apparent tension between the dictates 
of the Commodity Exchange Act, which is a crucial law that governs the derivatives marketplace 
and the antitrust laws, the dispute should be sent to the regulator – in this case the predecessor to 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Commodity Exchange Administration – to 
determine whether the antitrust claims should proceed to court or be decided at the agency 
level.109 
In Ricci, the plaintiff alleged that the CME transferred the plaintiff’s membership in the 
exchange to another entity without notice or a hearing.  Ricci was excluded from trading on the 
CME for almost a month, after which he purchased another membership at a much higher price 
than the cost of his previous membership.110 
The Ricci Court undertook a thorough analysis of the Commodity Exchange Act and the 
accompanying regulations promulgated thereunder before summarizing the problem in the case 
as: 
 
…[A]ris[ing] when the reach of the antitrust laws is also at least arguably 
protected or prohibited by another regulatory statue enacted by Congress.  Often, 
but not always, the other regime includes an administrative agency with authority 
to enforce the major provisions of the statue in accordance with that statute’s 
distinctive standards, which may or may not include concern for competitive 
considerations.111 
At the time of Ricci, the CEA did not contain any antitrust provision, i.e., any directive 
that required the Commodity Exchange Commission to review or consider the impact of the 
 
106 After Gordon at 117. 
107 373 U.S. at 357. 
108 409 U.S. 289 (1973). 
109 Id. at 290.  See also United States v. Western Pacific Railroad, 352 U.S. 59, 64 (“Primary jurisdiction… applies 
where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim 
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence 
of an administrative body; in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the 
administrative body for its views”). 
110 Ricci, 409 U.S. at 290-91. 
111 Id. at 299-300. 
27
antitrust laws in undertaking its activities.112 Nonetheless, the Ricci Court distinguished Silver 
and held that the doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction applied to the matter.  As a result, the dispute 
was stayed and sent to the Commodity Exchange Commission for resolution.113 The Court’s 
decision rested on three important premises: 
 
(1) that it will be essential for the antitrust court to determine whether the 
Commodity Exchange Act or any of its provision are “incompatible with the 
maintenance of an antitrust action; (2) that some facets of the dispute between 
Ricci and the Exchange are within the statutory jurisdiction of the Commodity 
Exchange Commission; and (3) that adjudication of that dispute by the 
Commission promises to be of material aid in resolving the immunity question.114 
The next step in the progression of the “get to court” cases was Gordon v. New York 
Stock Exchange.115 In Gordon, the plaintiff alleged that a variety of NYSE rules and practices, 
in particular fixed commission rates, violated the Sherman Act.116 In reviewing the issue, the 
Court made clear that determining antitrust immunity and/or implied repeal involved a fact-
intensive analysis:  “Resolution of the issue of antitrust immunity for fixed commission rates 
may be made adequately only upon a thorough investigation of the practice in the light of 
statutory restrictions and decided cases.”117 Upon conducting this review, the Court concluded 
that “the commission rate practices of the exchanges have been subjected to the scrutiny and 
approval of the SEC.  If antitrust courts were to impose different standards or requirements, the 
exchanges might find themselves unable to proceed without violation of the mandate of the 
courts or of the SEC.”118 Accordingly, the Court dismissed the matter based on the Implied 
Repeal/antitrust immunity doctrine. 
 
The next significant implied repeal case involving an antitrust matter and the Commodity 
Exchange Act was decided by the Second Circuit in 1985:  Strobl v. New York Mercantile 
Exchange.119 This matter is important from an implied repeal perspective because the underlying 
 
112 After Gordon at 119 & 122 (“under the Commodity Exchange Act at [the] time, ‘[t]he [CEA’s] area of 
administrative authority does not appear to be particularly focused on competitive considerations; there is no express 
provision in the Act directing administrative officials to consider the policies of the antitrust laws in carrying out 
their duties…’”)(citing Ricci at 302 n.13). 
113 Ricci, 409 U.S. at 302-06. 
114 Id. at 302.  Notably, the Court stated that it did not “find that Congress intended the Act to confer general 
antitrust immunity on the Exchange and its members with respect to that area of conduct within the adjudicative or 
rule-making authority of the Commission…”  Id.
115 422 U.S. 659 (1975). 
116 Id. at 661. 
117 Id. at 663. 
118 Id. at 689.  The Court distinguished Silver by noting that “the regulatory agency [in Silver] could not prevent 
application of the rules that would have undesirable anticompetitive effects; there was no governmental oversight of 
the exchange’s self-regulatory action, and no method of insuring that some attention at least was given to the public 
interest in competition.”  Id. at 684. 
119 768 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985).  In the interim period, the Supreme Court found 
implied repeal in a securities case, United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 
(1975)(“NASD”).  In NASD, the Court was faced with the question whether the National Association of Securities 
Dealers, and other entities, had agreed to restrict the sale, and to fix the resale prices, of mutual fund shares in the 
secondary market.  Id. at 700.  The NASD Court held that the “pervasive regulatory scheme” gave the Securities and 
Exchange Commission authority to regulate such conduct and that the implied repeal of the Sherman Act with 
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factual claims in the case involve price manipulation – an offense that is specifically prohibited 
under the CEA.120 The defendants in Strobl argued that, based on Silver and Gordon, the 
antitrust laws no longer applied to activity that violated the CEA.121 The Second Circuit was not 
persuaded and,found that the case law held otherwise: 
 
Defendants claim that Silver and Gordon can be read to say that when a 
commodities exchange activity is subject to the jurisdiction of some regulatory 
body, it is exempt from the antitrust laws.  This over-simplified reading does not 
survive closer analysis.  Both Silver and Gordon discussed potential conflicts 
between the antitrust laws and a regulatory scheme. [citations omitted].  Their 
holdings teach that antitrust laws may not apply when such laws would prohibit 
an action that a regulatory scheme might allow.122 
The Strobl Court then articulated the Gordon “plain repugnancy” standard, i.e., that only 
where there is a plain repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the underlying regulatory 
scheme will implied repeal be found.123 The Court further noted that a simple “overlap” between 
the antitrust laws and the regulatory scheme is not sufficient for implied repeal.124 
After a detailed analysis of the price manipulation provisions of the CEA, as well as the 
legislative history of the 1974 amendments to the CEA, the Strobl Court held that “Congress 
desired the continued application of the antitrust laws to those anti-competitive practices that 
also violate the Commodity Exchange Act.  There is no doubt that such laws have traditionally 
been applied to the commodities industry.”125 
Almost twenty years later, the Second Circuit was again faced with an implied repeal 
matter – in the securities, rather than commodities area: In re: Stock Exchanges Options Trading 
Antitrust Litigation.126 While not overruling or even negatively commenting on Strobl,127 the 
Second Circuit appeared to reverse course and find implied repeal of the antitrust laws in a 
securities law matter.  The Court held that implied repeal was necessary “to preserve the 
authority of the SEC to regulate th[e] conduct [at issue].”128 
respect to that conduct was necessary in order to preserve the Commission flexibility to perform its authorized 
function.  Id. at 734-35. 
120 Id. at 25-26, n.1. 
121 Id. at 26. 
122 Id. at 27. 
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 28.  For additional analysis of Strobl, see John Kern, Price Manipulation in the Commodity Futures 
Markets: A Reexamination of the Justifications for Simultaneous Causes of Action Under the CEA and the Sherman 
Act, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1305 (1987); David E. Danovitch, Antitrust Law—Conduct Forbidden Under Commodities 
Exchange Act is not Implicitly Exempt from Scrutiny under Antitrust Laws – Strobl v. New York Mercantile 
Exchange, 768 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1985), 20 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 673 (1986); Alan Schacter, The Availability of Antitrust 
Treble Damages for Commodities Market Manipulation, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 853 (1986). 
126 317 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003). 
127 Id. at 148 (“To be sure, antitrust immunity is not to be presumed from the mere existence of overlapping 
authority; rather the analysis must focus on the ‘potential’ for ‘conflicts between the antitrust laws and an 
authorized’ regulatory scheme”). 
128 Id. 
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The “conduct at issue” involved trading of equity options on multiple exchanges. The 
Stock Options Court went to great pains to demonstrate that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) had considered this question under its governing statutes at great length 
and over a period of thirty years, taking contradictory positions over time.129 The Court 
identified the implied immunity test as “operating in narrowly-defined situations”: 
 
First, when an agency, acting pursuant to a specific Congressional directive, 
actively regulates the particular conduct challenged, … and second, when the 
regulatory scheme is so pervasive that Congress must be assumed to have 
forsworn the paradigm of competition.130 
The Court noted that a conflict between the antitrust laws and the regulation of equity 
options trading did not exist; nonetheless: 
 
The appropriateness of an implied repeal does not turn on whether the antitrust 
laws conflict with the current view of the regulatory agency; rather it turns on 
whether the antitrust laws conflict with an overall regulatory scheme that 
empowers the agency to allow conduct that the antitrust laws would prohibit.131 
Accordingly, despite the Strobl Court’s clear focus on “conflicts” between the antitrust 
laws and the regulatory scheme at issue as the lynchpin in the implied repeal context, the Stock 
Options Court “saw no way to reconcile [] SEC authority… with the antitrust laws” even absent 
any apparent conflicts between the statutes.132 We note that the Court reached its decision 
despite an amicus brief from both the SEC and the Department of Justice urging that it not grant 
immunity. 
 
The Supreme Court recently touched – but did not make any new pronouncements on – 
implied repeal in the context of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in Verizon 
Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko.133 This case is significant from a number of 
perspectives in that the Court addressed issues important in the commodities area – refusals to 
deal in regulated industries, the “Essential Facilities” Doctrine, as well as monopoly leveraging.  
These topics are discussed in greater detail in Section ___, infra. 
Briefly, Trinko involved an antitrust challenge by a customer of a competitor of Verizon 
Communications, which was the local exchange carrier (“LEC”) for telecommunications in New 
York State.  The 1996 Telecommunications Act sought to “uproo[t]” the incumbent LEC’s 
monopoly and to introduce competition in its place.134 In other words, the statute provided for 
 
129 Id. at 139-42. 
130 Id. at 147. 
131 Id. at 149. 
132 Id. at 150. 
133 540 U.S. 398 (2004).  While this Section of the Article focuses on the Implied Repeal cases from the securities 
and/or commodities area, we feel it worthwhile to review Trinko because of its recent comments on the Implied 
Repeal doctrine, as well as the fact that Trinko was the basis of the decision in New York Mercantile Exchange v. 
IntercontinentalExchange, 389 F.Supp.2d 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), discussed infra.
134 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402. 
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new competition to emerge in the local telephone market.  Trinko alleged that, despite Verizon’s 
obligations to act fairly and competitively vis a vis its competition pursuant to the statute, as well 
as a consent decree that it had entered into with the Federal Communications Commission, 
Verizon was filling rivals’ service orders on a discriminatory basis “as part of an anticompetitive 
scheme to discourage customers from becoming or remaining customers of competitive LECs, 
thus impeding the competitive LECs’ ability to enter and compete in the market for local 
telephone service.”135 
As to implied immunity, the Trinko Court, in dicta, noted that: 
 
[A] detailed regulatory scheme such as that created by the 1996 Act ordinarily 
raises the question whether the regulated entities are not shielded from antitrust 
scrutiny altogether by the doctrine of implied immunity.  In some respects the 
enforcement scheme set up by the 1996 Act is a good candidate for implication of 
antitrust immunity, to avoid the real possibility of judgments conflicting with the 
agency’s regulatory scheme “that might be voiced by courts exercising 
jurisdiction under the antitrust laws.”136 
As such, while the relevant passage is only dicta, it can be argued that Trinko appears to 
reinforce the Strobl standard of reviewing whether the antitrust laws and the regulatory scheme 
at issue “conflict” in some respect, as opposed to the general “pervasive regulatory scheme” 
analysis put forward by Stock Options.
B. Making Sense of the “Get to Court” Cases 
To say that the Implied Repeal/Primary Jurisdiction cases do not provide adequate 
guidelines or a satisfactory standard to follow in future cases is an understatement.  Nonetheless, 
there appear to be a few “boundaries” that, at least, highlight the edges of the doctrine.    
 
We suggest that the law on antitrust immunity should rest on several tenets.  First, that an 
administrative agency has the ability to immunize firms from antitrust immunity.  Presumably, 
the whole point of an administrative agency is that it has specialized authority over a segment of 
the economy where open markets are subject to some type of failure.  Thus, it is not surprising 
that an agency may wish to trump the antitrust laws.  Courts should consider allowing this out of 
respect for the agency’s mission.   
 
This does not mean that it is should be easy to gain antitrust immunity.  Consumers’ 
rights to the benefits of competition are important, and should be protected.  If agencies do not 
directly assert antitrust immunity, or have policies that directly contradict antitrust principles, 
then it should not be granted.  Here, we believe there is much wisdom in the “plain repugnancy” 
standard articulated by the Gordon court. 
 
The early cases in the line discussed above hold true to these principles.  It is only when 
we get to the Stock Options case that problems arise.  In that matter, the defendants were granted 
 
135 Id. at 404. 
136 Id. at 406 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
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antitrust immunity, despite a plea otherwise from the SEC, the relevant regulatory authority.  
Further, the grounds for the denial was not that the activity directly regulated by the SEC, but 
that it could be directly regulated by the SEC.  Thus, such a ruling does not even allow a 
regulatory agency to deny authority. 
 
The Trinko decision, while not as troublesome as Stock Options, also generates some 
qualms for us.  Trinko related to a competitive matter directly regulated by the FCC.  FCC 
regulation is broad and perhaps all-encompassing.  If any party has a complaint about that 
system, the FCC has a clear administrative process to deal with such a complaint. 
 
Now compare the FCC to the CFTC.  Unlike the FCC, the CFTC does not have a broad 
regulatory regime.  Historically, much of its authority has been delegated to self-regulatory 
organizations, such as the CME and CBOT.  Though antitrust was added as a core principle in 
2000 in the CFMA, to date the CME/LIFFE matter is the first case the CFTC has been asked to 
opine upon. 
 
Other questions remain.  If a complaint is sent to the CFTC, does the CFTC have to 
respond?  If it does not, is the complainant precluded from going to court?  Further, what 
remedies does the CFTC have?  The CFTC administrative process is enormously time 
consuming.  As of the beginning of 2005, the CFTC had cases that involved events occurring in 
1994 and before still before it.  Should the CFTC have the ability to grant injunctive relief?  
Should the CFTC be able to assess treble antitrust damages? 
 
All this implies that the CFTC should have the right to assert antitrust immunity for 
certain matters.  But if the CFTC does not, that should not preclude parties from gaining their 
day in court.  
 
IV. Types of Antitrust Cases 
 
Rule of reason cases can fall into several categories.  Of particular importance to 
commodity exchanges are vertical restraint cases, predation cases, and essential facilities cases. 
 
A. Vertical Restraint Cases 
 
1. Theory 
 
A vertical restraint is a restraint that a producing firm places on its customers.   For 
example, refiners often constraint their affiliated gasoline stations not to sell other brands of 
gasoline.  Automobile manufacturers require their dealers to have extensive showrooms. 
 
Non-price vertical restraints are subject to rule of reason.137 The rule of reason requires 
an anticompetitive theory and evidentiary support for that theory. Here we will focus on the 
 
137 Vertical restraints that set a minimum price are per se illegal. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons 
Co., 220 U.S. 373.  Vertical restraints that set a maximum price are subject to rule of reason analysis.  See State Oil 
Co. v. Khan, 522 US 2 (1997). 
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potential for such a restraint to create significant barrier to entry, and therefore significant 
reductions in the ability of an entrant to compete in the market.138 
Such an anticompetitive theory has three necessary conditions.139 First, there must be 
significant economies of scale in the relevant industry.  This condition seems to be met with 
respect to commodity exchanges.  It would appear that to be viable in a particular contract, a 
trading platform must have a substantial share of the relevant market.  Indeed, we discuss above 
how competition between exchanges is “for the market,” with the winner of the competition 
gaining all of the relevant business. 
 
Second, the number of firms potentially precluded by the restraint in question must be of 
such size to deter the potential entrant from growing large enough to achieve financial viability.  
In this case, if the competition is truly for the entire market, excluding any sizable block of 
customers might be enough to “tip” the market back toward the incumbent. 
 
Finally, the restraint itself must be of “competitive significance.”  That is, it must pose a 
large enough economic deterrent to stop the affected firms from switching away from the 
incumbent.   Thus, if the restraint in question “ties up” one percent of a market, it is not likely to 
be of competitive significant.  On the other hand, if it ties up 50 percent of a market, it is likely to 
be competitively significant. 
 
It is also possible that such a restraint has pro-competitive effects on economic efficiency.  
The standard example is to deter free riding or “shirking” on an unpriced resource.140 An issue 
that may be of importance in commodity exchange competition is one exchange “free-riding” off 
the settlement (closing) price of another exchange.141 
2.  Application I:  USFE v. CBOT/CME
In November 2003, U.S. Futures Exchange (USFE, a subsidiary of EUREX, a German 
exchange company) filed suit in Federal Court against the Chicago Board of Trade and the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange.   The suit essentially asserted that CBOT (with perhaps some 
help from CME) attempted to preclude a U.S. Futures entrant exchange from having access to 
clearinghouse and regulatory services.   
 
In brief, the pertinent facts are as follows: On January 10, 2003, Eurex announced that 
USFE would launch a U.S. exchange to compete with CBOT and CME in financial and stock 
 
138 Alternative anticompetitive theories of vertical restraints deal with restraints as collusive facilitation devices.  Get 
citation.  These do not appear relevant, at least to date, for commodity exchanges.  
139 A helpful article in the economics literature is Stefanadis, “Selective Contracts, Foreclosure, and the Chicago 
School View,” Journal of Law and Economics, 1998, 41(2-1) 429-450.  Legal analysis includes Roland Machinery 
v. Dresser, 749 F.2d 380, 383 (7th Circuit, 1984) ( Posner  J.), Interface Group, Inc. v. Mass. Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 
11 (1st Cir. 1987) (Breyer, J.), Paddock v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42 (7th Cir. 1996)(Easterbrook, J.) and 
Omega v. Gilbarco, 127 F.3rd 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997)(Wright, J.).  
140 See, for example, Klein and. Murphy, “‘Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms’, Journal of 
Law and Economics, 31:2 (1988) 265. 
141 See Mulherin, Netter, and Overdahl, Prices Are Property: The Organization of Financial Exchanges from a 
Transaction Cost Perspective, Journal of Law and Economics 34:2(2) (1992) 591. 
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futures and derivatives.  In April of 2003, CBOT announced it was ending its 78 year old 
relationship with TCC, a clearinghouse owned in part by CBOT members. 
On May 20, 2003, Eurex entered into an agreement with TCC to purchase all of TCC’s 
stock, apparently for the purposes of using TCC as a clearinghouse for the incoming USFE 
exchange.  On May 19 (one day previously) CBOT offered to purchase TCC for (according to 
the USFE November 2003 brief at 10) “approximately $150-200 million, for the single purpose 
of shutting down TCC.”  This offer was rejected by TCC. Subsequently, TCC stockholders 
voted to approve the acquisition by Eurex, after Eurex agreed to pay TCC stockholders 
additional monies.   
 
Taking the allegations by USFE as true, we can see the clear outline of a rule of reason 
antitrust case.  Commodity exchanges are potentially a concentrated market. Given the 
discussion above of network effects, they would appear to have important barriers to entry.   
Clearinghouses are necessary to compete in the commodity exchange market.  Thus, if CBOT 
can deny USFE access to clearinghouse services, a vertically related product, then CBOT would 
be able to maintain any market power they might have over services provided at a commodity 
exchange. 
 
This theory, however, poses several factual challenges.  First, USFE will be required to 
show that commodity exchanges are a relevant antitrust market.  In particular, a variety of 
financial contracts are traded “over the counter,” as the result of bilateral negotiations between 
parties.  To advance its market definition argument, USFE asserted [para 63] that “[a] registered 
exchange differs from other trading environments, such as over-the-counter trades, because the 
regulatory environment allows for anonymity, greater liquidity, a distinct customer base, 
important trading and position benefits, and distinct tax advantages.” 
 
Second, USFE needs to show that acquiring TCC reduced significantly the cost and/or 
the time of acquiring clearinghouse services.  Certainly USFE could have created its own 
clearinghouse service, or perhaps used the EUREX clearinghouse in Germany for this regards.  
But these alternatives may well have been costly and likely not successful based on the 
experience of previous exchanges.142 
Finally, even should USFE be able to show antitrust liability on the part of the 
defendants, they would still need to show damages.  Here, the damages would be the extra funds 
needed to acquire TCC, above and beyond what they would have paid had CBOT not interfered 
in the process. 
 
But CBOT also has a potential burden of its own.  There is likely no efficiency 
justification for purchasing a firm merely to shut it down, as the USFE complaint alleges.  This 
type of output-contracting arrangement, as with price fixing and territorial allocation, is arguably 
per se illegal under the antitrust laws 
 
142 For example, the BrokerTec Exchange, discussed infra established its own clearing house at much expense and 
lack of success. 
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The reason for per se cases is now well known.143 In the three-pronged theory, if a 
particular practice is 1) likely to cause harm, 2) unlikely to generate benefit, and 3) showing the 
economic effects of that harm may be difficult to show, a per se rule can represent an efficient 
legal standard.  Shutting down a clearinghouse to stop it from being acquired by a potential rival 
may well meet this standard. 
 
First, shutting down an economic unit that would otherwise operate is likely to reduce 
economic output, harming consumers.  Second, it is very difficult to establish an economic 
efficiency argument from this behavior.  Third, if the Cellophane trap problem discussed above 
makes it difficult to establish market definition in these contexts, then economic effects may well 
be difficult to show empirically.   Thus, CBOT may have difficulty defending its actions from a 
legal attack based on a per se theory. 
 
Currently, the case between USFE and CBOT is in the discovery phase.  CBOT and 
CME filed motions to dismiss the lawsuit.  The Court, in a short, but harshly worded opinion, 
denied these motions, sending the case into discovery.144 If the case is not resolved by way of 
settlement or summary judgment, it will likely go to trial in 2007.  
 
3.  Application II: CME/LIFFE.
a. The Restraint in Question 
 
CME operates a trading platform for Eurodollars futures contracts.  Long or short 
positions in Eurodollars futures essentially constitute a position on the future movement of 
interest rates over a three month period.  The payoff to owning (going long) N contracts, each 
with “nominal value” of $1,000,000, acquired at a reference price P, equals 
 
Payoff=(90/360)*N*$1 million * (CD – (1-P)),  
 
where CD is a calculated “average” offer rate on three month commercial deposits of U.S. 
dollars in London banks at the relevant point in time.145 (So the 90/360 represents the length in 
years of the contract.)  For example, assume a customer take a long position in 200 contracts at a 
reference price (P) of 0.96146 for settlement in three months.   At the time of settlement, the 
average CD rate on U.S. dollars in London is 4.4 percent annualized.  The customer’s payoff is 
therefore 
 
Payoff= (90/360)*$200 million *(0.044-0.04) = $200,000. 
 
(This works out to $25 per basis point per contract.)  Eurodollars are designed to hedge risk for 
firms that that have pre-existing risks due to fluctuations in short term interest rates.  Such firms, 
 
143 Much of this discussion comes from Posner, Antitrust Law (2001, 2nd edition) 39-40. 
144 U.S. Futures Exchange v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 1:04-cv-06756 (N.D. IL August 22, 
2005)(Judge James B. Zagel). 
145 This is equivalent to the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) used in other interest rate products.  
146 Due to financial market conventions, the proper way to interpret a reference price of 0.96 is as an interest rate of 
1 minus the price, 0.04, or a 4 percent annualized rate. 
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for example, could be either long or short in short-term commercial loans or paper that has 
floating interest rates denominate in U.S. dollars.147 
LIFFE was a new entrant in Eurodollar futures trading platforms, competing with CME’s 
established Eurodollar futures platform.  LIFFE began competing on March 18, 2004.  CME had 
previously created a “block trading facility,” which allowed customers to trade large blocks of 
Eurodollar contracts without exposing them on the “floor” of the CME exchange.  The basic 
rationale behind block trading facilities is that block trading allows large numbers of contracts to 
be transacted at a single price without the “price slippage” that would occur were these contracts 
to be traded on the floor of the exchange. 
 
A major customer of CME used the CME’s block trading facility to liquidate its position 
of approximately 36,000 Eurodollar contracts with several different settlement dates on CME 
and moved them to LIFFE on June 11, 2004.  Then, through pre-arrangement, the customer 
replicated this position by purchases on LIFFE’s Eurodollar futures exchange. 
 
Subsequent to this action, CME revised its interpretation of its own exchange wash 
trading rules, Rule 432.D, and declared that further such prearranged trading would be 
considered a “fictitious” or a “wash trade.”148 LIFFE then presented a petition to the CFTC, 
asserting that this interpretation of CME’s rule constituted an anticompetitive restraint of trade, 
in violation of Core Principle 18 of the 2000 CFMA .  
 
b. Can a Manufacturer Restrict Its Rivals’ Customers from Using 
its Facilities? 
 
Before we further delve into this issue, one topic must be dealt with.  It is clear that CME 
is under no antitrust obligation to offer a block trading facility.  Thus, given that they offer a 
block trading facility, under the antitrust laws, are they required to offer it in a non-
discriminatory fashion to customers of their rival, LIFFE?  
 
This question was directly addressed in the D.C. Circuit en ban per curiam decision in 
the Microsoft case.149 A crucial issue in that case was whether Microsoft could impose 
restrictions on the use of its products when they were licensed to original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs).  The Justice Department’s theory of the case asserted that Microsoft’s 
restrictions on OEM’s use of its products was anticompetitive.  Microsoft claimed, however, that 
its property rights under copyright laws precluded antitrust liability. 
 
Microsoft’s argument was not well received by the D.C. Circuit.  In finding the relevant 
restraints actionable under the antitrust laws, the court stated:  
 
147 For details on the CME Eurodollars specifications, see 
http://www.cme.com/clearing/clr/spec/contract_specifications_all.html?type=itr. 
148 Wash trading is per se illegal by the Commodity Exchange Act, codified as U.S. Code. Title 7, Chapter 1,Sec. 
6c. However, the definition of wash trading is not clear.  Here we will abstract from the highly complex and 
confusing issues surround the definition of the term “wash trade.” 
149 Microsoft v. U.S. 253 F.3d 34 (2001). 
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Microsoft argues that the license restrictions are legally justified 
because, in imposing them, Microsoft is simply "exercising its rights as 
the holder of valid copyrights." Appellant's Opening Br. at  102. Microsoft 
also argues that the licenses "do not unduly restrict the opportunities of 
Netscape to distribute Navigator in any event." Id. 
Microsoft's primary copyright argument borders upon the frivolous. 
The company claims an absolute and unfettered right to use its intellectual 
property as it wishes: "If intellectual property rights have been lawfully 
acquired," it says, then "their subsequent exercise cannot give rise to 
antitrust liability" Appellant's Opening Br. at 105. That is no more correct 
than the proposition that use of one's personal property, such as a baseball 
bat, cannot give rise to tort liability. As the Federal Circuit succinctly 
stated: "Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the 
antitrust laws." In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000).150 
We suspect that the court’s opinion does not do justice to the nuances of Microsoft’s 
position.  Nevertheless, the decision is clear:  claims of property rights do not preclude antitrust 
liability.   
 
The parallel between Microsoft and CME/LIFFE is also clear.  Microsoft was under no 
requirement to license its products.  Given that it did, however, such licenses could not contain 
anticompetitive provisions.  This rule therefore implies that CME was under no obligation to 
offer a block trading facility.  Given that it did, however, CME’s rules governing the facility can 
not contain anticompetitive provisions. 
 
c. Available Information on Market Definition 
 
As discussed above, for a monopolization case to proceed, the moving party must show 
that the threat of monopoly occurs in a distinct antitrust market.  This can pose a very difficult 
task, as can be observed in the CME/LIFFE matter. 
 
Eurodollar futures contracts are linked to the commercial interest rate on U.S. dollar-
denominated bank deposits in London.  They are one of a class of contracts referred too as “short 
term interest rate” (or “STIR”) products.  STIR products serve to mitigate the interest rate risk a 
variety of firms have on their short-run financial obligations.  Two obvious substitutes for 
Eurodollar contracts are Euribor futures contracts, a three month contract based on Euro interest 
rates instruments, and the one month LIBOR contracts, which, like Eurodollars, are based on the 
London interbank rate.  In addition, there are a variety of over the counter (non-exchange traded) 
STIR instruments available. 
 
According to Kolb and Overdahl, there has been a great deal of customer switching in 
these products in the last 20 years.151 In particular, customers have moved from three month 
 
150 Id. at 92-93. 
151 Kolb and Overdahl, Understanding Futures Markets,(2006, 6th ed.), 276-278. 
37
treasury futures to Eurodollar futures.  This might imply the two products are in the same market.  
Under the Merger Guidelines approach, however, the test is whether customers would switch 
were there a “small but significant” change in the fees for using a particular exchange. 
 
The challenge for LIFFE in this proceeding was to present evidence showing that 
Eurodollar futures trading platforms constituted a separate antitrust market.  Indeed, LIFFE had 
to demonstrate a market for Eurodollars that does not include the other STIR products.  It is 
difficult to conclude that LIFFE met its burden before the CFTC. 
 
In its November 19, 2004 letter to the CFTC, LIFFE asserted as one sign of market power 
that CME engaged in price discrimination against different classes of members.  The theory here 
is that in a competitive market all customers must be offered the same price, or the lower priced 
firm will take customers from the higher priced firm.  CME’s pricing, however, can be seen as 
merely offering lower prices to those members who invested capital in CME.  It is perfectly 
consistent with competition.  For example, one could imagine a private golf country club 
opening up its course to non-members once a week for a large greens fee, even in a competitive 
market for golf clubs. 
 
LIFFE also asserted in its answers to questions on November 19, 2004 that Eurodollar 
futures are functionally different from other STIR products that are denominated in other, as 
those have different interest rate fluctuations.  In addition, LIFFE posited that OTC instruments 
are not substitutes because they are not exchange traded, and therefore do not offer anonymity, 
price transparency, or resolve credit concerns.   
 
Focusing on different product attributes is a beginning to a market definition analysis.  
But the moving party needs to show that these differences are competitively important to these 
products’ customers.  LIFFE did not do so.152 
Perhaps the best LIFFE attempt was in its April 11, 2005 letter (at 13-15).  In this letter 
LIFFE presented a series of price and product changes CME made after LIFFE announced its 
decision to enter into a Eurodollar platform, similar to the approach that prevailed in Staples.
However, CME made the obvious rebuttal that these innovations were a part of general industry 
trends toward modernization and new products.  To sustain its point, LIFFE would have to show 
that these actions were a result of the LIFFE entry, and that other firms producing STIR products 
did not make similar actions.  LIFFE did not address this question. 
 
In conclusion, LIFFE did not meet its burden of showing that Eurodollar futures trading 
platforms constitute a separate antitrust market. 
 
152 In addition, LIFFE asserted (at 12) that Eurodollars have a “high degree of price correlation to OTC 
instruments,” which would imply that OTC instruments might be a competitive substitute for Eurodollars.  As 
Werden and Froeb, Correlation, Causality, and All that Jazz: The Inherent Shortcomings of Price Tests for Antitrust 
Market Delineation, Review of Industrial Organization  June 1993; 8(3): 329-53, show, however, price correlations 
do not shed useful information on questions of market definition. 
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d. Barrier to Entry Analysis 
 
Once the market definition analysis is complete, it is then necessary to determine whether 
or not the restraint in question constituted a “significant” barrier to entry.  There are two ways we 
will approach this question in the CME/LIFFE matter.  First, we will ask if the restraint in 
question significantly increased the time it would take for LIFFE to become a competitive force 
in Eurodollars.  Second, we will example the costs the restraint may have imposed upon 
customers who may have desired to switch from CME to LIFFE. 
 
(i) Time To Entry Analysis 
 
One alternative for LIFFE’s customers to avoid the CME rule is for these clients to 
simply allow their positions on CME to expire, and then take up new positions on LIFFE.  There 
are, however, two potential problems with this remedy. 
 
The first problem is that it could be expensive for customers to hold positions on two 
different exchanges for the length of their contracts.  This might require two sets of monitoring 
clearing operations, and two sets of broker-dealer relationships.   LIFFE, however, did not make 
an argument that these costs would be important.   
 
It can also be argued that time is an important barrier to entry here.  If LIFFE customers 
are required to have their CME positions expire, it will take them time to move onto LIFFE.  
How much time depends on the length of the contracts. 
 
To examine this question, we looked at CME Eurodollar open interest on April 22, 2005 
(a date chosen at random).  We calculated in each three month period what fraction of contracts 
expired.  There were approximately 8.15 million open contracts on April 22.  1.4 million 
contracts, or 17.3 percent, expired in three months.  Obviously, 17.3 percent is not sufficient to 
support new entry in a network economy, where networks effects due to liquidity issues make 
the competition for the entire market. 
 
One year into the future, the fraction of expired contracts rises to 60.3 percent, and two 
years in to the future the fraction of contracts rises to 83.4 percent.  Given that network effects 
imply one has to have a majority of the relevant market (under the maintained assumption that 
Eurodollar futures exchanges are the relevant market), this data clearly indicates that the restraint 
could enable a Eurodollar monopolist (as CME is posited to be) to enjoy monopoly profits for at 
least one year. 
 
Making a determination of time to entry past one year requires certain assumptions.  Over 
half of the contract would be available at the one year mark.  It seems unreasonable, however, to 
expect a new entrant to get (almost) 100 percent of the new contracts that are entered into that 
are designed to replace to expiring contracts. 
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Table 2 
CME Eurodollar Open Interest 
April 22, 2005 
Total Contracts: 8,157,285 
Source:  Wall Street Journal 
 
Months to 
Settlement
Cumulative 
Contracts 
 Percent of all Contracts 
3 1,409,281 17.3% 
6 2,796,916 34.3% 
9 4,044,894 49.6% 
12 4,918,277 60.3% 
15 5,584,939 68.5% 
18 6,059,146 74.3% 
21 6,519,868 79.9% 
24 6,805,676 83.4% 
27 7,030,697 86.2% 
30 7,205,636 88.3% 
(ii) Cost of Exit as a Barrier to Entry 
Assuming that simply allowing positions to roll over is not a competitive alternative, the 
remaining path, absent the use of the block trading facility, for CME customers to switch to 
LIFFE is for them to trade out their positions on CME, and trade back into them on LIFFE.  The 
question then becomes whether or not the costs of such trades are significant, relative to the cost 
savings that a more competitive exchange might offer. 
 
LIFFE has asserted that to switch the 36,000 contracts from CME to LIFFE by trading on 
the CME floor would impose a cost on the relevant customer of approximately $1.1 million, or 
about $30.55 per contract.  The cost is generated by calculating the average bid-ask spread that a 
customer would have to pay to move contracts.153 Our review indicates that LIFFE did not 
accounted for any price slippage154 (especially on LIFFE) that would have occurred should a 
customer attempt to get out of this many positions.  Thus, the LIFFE figure appears to be an 
underestimate. 
 
How much could a customer save in exchange usage fees by switching to LIFFE?  
Perhaps not very much.  LIFFE stated that a customer could save only at most 18 cents per 
contract.155 Since contract fees appear relatively small relative to contract values (perhaps 40 
 
153 LIFFE April 11, 2005 letter at 2-3.   
154 For a discussion of price slippage (or “market impacts”) see Harris, Trading and Exchanges (2003) 72-73, and the 
discussion above. 
155 LIFFE April 11, 2005 letter at 4. 
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cents on a contract), this may well have been a reasonable estimate.   Thus, the costs of switching 
contracts are far greater than the savings on those contracts, and thus may well be considered a 
significant barrier to entry.156 
The figures LIFFE presented to the CFTC were made available to CME, and CME was 
given the opportunity to respond to them.  CME, however, chose not to respond.157 Given this, it 
may be appropriate to accept LIFFE’s position on this issue.158 
e. CME/LIFFE Conclusion and the Difficulty with the Trinko 
Dicta in the Commodity Exchange Arena 
 
Faced with a complaint, the CFTC did very little.   It issued no subpoenas.   There is no 
evidence it conducted interviews with interested parties.  It merely issued requests for the two 
parties to submit letters to it.   
 
The CFTC never issued any opinion in this matter.  Rather, on August 31, 2005, 
seventeen months after it filed its complaint, LIFFE announced it was closing its Eurodollar 
trading facility.  LIFFE had little choice, for after CME issued its “interpretation” of its wash 
trading rule, LIFFE was unable to wrestle any significant Eurodollar open interest or volume 
from CME.159 
While, as noted infra, Section ___, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Trinko did not 
make any new law in the implied immunity doctrine, it did make some dangerous “noise” by 
way of dicta concerning when courts should and should not take on a case that involves both 
antitrust issues and a regulatory authority.  In Trinko, the Court noted that where there is a 
detailed regulatory scheme, it is incumbent on courts to consider whether “the regulated entities 
are not shielded from antitrust scrutiny altogether by the doctrine of implied immunity” and that 
it is important for courts “to avoid the real possibility of judgments conflicting with the agency’s 
regulatory scheme.”160 
For whatever reason, LIFFE decided to pursue its complaint with the CME’s rule 
interpretation before the CFTC, rather than pursuing the matter in court.  Undoubtedly, had 
LIFFE gone the court route, the CME would have argued, inter alia, that under Trinko and the 
rest of the implied immunity cases, the matter should have been dismissed (and the only relief 
would be before the CFTC). Our belief is that, had these events occurred, CME’s argument 
should have failed and LIFFE would have had the opportunity to pursue this matter in court 
(indeed, LIFFE may still have a cause of action against CME). 
 
156 Note, however, that LIFFE did not present to the CFTC the cost of using the block trading facility to move the 
36,000 contracts. 
157 See Letter from Jerold Salzman to Richard Shilts, November 11, 2004, at 2. 
158 Typically, a vertical restraint would be subject to an analysis of if it had any pro-efficiency consequences. CME, 
however, explicitly denied that the restraint was designed to reduce free-riding.  According to CME, “CME’s 
interpretation does not directly or indirectly address the free-riding problem.” 
159 In fairness to the CFTC, however, LIFFE never asked for any specific relief.  It merely asked the CFTC to look 
into the matter. 
160 Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 406 (2004). 
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Given that the law and regulations governing commodity exchanges changed 
significantly in 2000 by way of the passage of the CFMA, it would have been difficult for CME 
to argue, along the lines of Verizon in Trinko, that a “pervasive regulatory scheme” is in place 
that effectively grants a “get out of jail free” card (implied immunity) to CME.  The CFMA was 
revolutionary in regulatory oversight in that it effectively shifted the power of regulation from 
the CFTC to the exchanges it regulates.  That is, the CFMA went from a prescriptive regulatory 
regime to a “Core Principles” approach.  In simple terms, once an exchange is granted 
“Designated Contract Market” status (an exchange license), it is able to “self-certify” most 
anything it wants with respect to its rules and operating procedures.161 The CME took this 
approach when it “self-certified” its rule interpretation.  It simply told the CFTC that it was 
going to take this approach to deal with what it viewed as wash trading under its self-regulation 
duties. 
 
Thus, the regulator and the regulatory scheme did not dictate any result in the matter.  As 
a result, the CFTC apparently was not certain how to respond to the complaint from LIFFE, so it 
did not do anything.  Because this matter went unresolved and the status quo prevailed, the CME 
won the battle and LIFFE’s Eurodollar contract went bust. 
 
Importantly, the CFTC has done very little – if anything – in response to an exchange 
self-certification since the passage of the CFMA. (Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, the 
CFTC has not done anything to stop an exchange self-certification since the CFMA amended the 
CEA in 2000.)  Thus, if the CFTC were to do anything in the LIFFE-CME matter, it would be 
plowing new ground.  There were, nonetheless, steps the CFTC at least theoretically could have 
taken. 
 
The mildest action would have to simply asked CME to demonstrate its continuing 
compliance with the CEA.  The most punitive measure would have been to initiate a criminal 
proceeding via referral to the Justice Department.  The range of responses is listed below in order 
that they are included in the Act, not in order of severity.  Initially, however, a brief background 
on the self-certification process is provided. 
 
Under Section 5c(c) of the CEA, Exchanges "may elect . . . to approve and implement 
any new rule or rule amendment, by providing to the Commission . . . A written certification that 
the new contract or instrument . . . complies with this Act." 
 
As noted, supra, Section ___ of this article, one of the requirements of the Act is found in 
Section 5(d)(18), which provides that "Unless necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes 
of the Act, [contract markets are required] to endeavor to avoid--adopting any rule or taking any 
actions that result in any unreasonable restraints of trade or imposing any material 
anticompetitive burden on trading on the contract market." 
 
161 Exchanges, at their own discretion, still have the ability to seek Commission approval of their rules or procedures 
under the Act.  See 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2. 
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If an exchange submits a false certification, there are a number of possible remedies 
available under the Act and rules.  Under section 5c(d) the Commission may determine whether 
a registered entity is violating any applicable core principle.  If the CFTC finds that the entity is 
violating a core principle, it shall notify the registered entity of its determination and afford the 
registered entity an opportunity to make appropriate changes to bring the registered entity into 
compliance.  If the registered entity does not do so, then the Commission may take such further 
action in accordance with the act.   Under the Act, the following further remedies would be 
available: 
 
1. Under 6b, the Commission may bring an administrative action (including 
fines and cease and desist orders) if any registered entity is violating or 
has violated any of the provisions of the Act.  Accordingly, the 
Commission may bring an administrative action for a false certification. 
 
2.  Under 6c, the Commission can seek an injunction or ask for a temporary 
restraining order whenever it appears to the Commission that a registered 
entity is violating or is about to act in a practice constituting a violation. 
 
3.   Under section 5e, the failure of a registered entity to comply with any 
provision of the Act, shall be cause for the suspension of the registered 
entity, or to have its designation revoked. 
 
4.   Under section 8a(7) of the Act, the Commission is empowered to "alter or 
supplement the rules of a registered entity insofar as necessary or 
appropriate . . . for the protection of persons producing , handling 
processing or consuming any commodity traded for future delivery, or for 
the protection of traders."  Section 8a(7) sets forth a specific procedure 
that must be followed, but it is basically notice and comment rulemaking, 
with some additional requirements. 
 
5.   Under section 9(a) it is a felony to "knowingly make any statement in any 
application report or document required to be filed which was false or 
misleading with respect to a material fact."  Because this is a criminal 
provision, it requires proving scienter so it would generally be difficult to 
apply, but would be available, with referral to the Justice Department, if 
the facts warranted. 
 
6.  As a separate matter, under Part 38 and the Act, the Designation 
Application requirements apply initially and on a continuing basis 
thereafter.  Accordingly, the Commission at any time can ask an exchange 
under rule 38.5(b) to demonstrate that the contract market is in compliance 
with one or more core principles. 
 
7.   Also as a separate matter, under Section 15(b), the Commission itself is 
required to take into consideration the public interest to be protected by 
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the antitrust laws. . . In issuing any order or adopt. . . Or requiring or 
approving any bylaw, rule or regulation of a contract market." 
 
Nonetheless, despite these remedies under the CEA, we were unable to find any action in 
which the CFTC utilized any of its authority in response to anticompetitive actions by an 
exchange.  Thus, the exchanges may have had the opportunity to engage in virtually any 
anticompetitive activity that they wanted unchecked.  The CEA, as amended by the CFMA has 
therefore had the effect of helping incumbents maintain their monopolies as they are allowed to 
create rules (or, for example, incentive programs for traders) that benefit and support their 
monopolies, as demonstrated by CME in their wash trading rule interpretation. 
 
Accordingly, we would recommend that courts faced with an antitrust (or other) 
complaint against a commodity exchange take a close look at the ability of the CFTC to take 
action (and its history in taking action – or, more appropriately, not taking action) before 
liberally interpreting the dicta in Trinko. Unfortunately, it can often be the case that, by 
deferring to a regulatory agency, courts leave antitrust plaintiffs without a remedy.   Stated 
differently, antitrust defendants are able to hide behind the doctrine of implied immunity 
knowing full well that they may be violating the antitrust laws.  As a result, the ultimate goal of 
antitrust law – providing the efficiency of the markets – is not served. 
 
B. Predation Cases 
 
1. Theory 
The basic predatory pricing theory goes something like this:  To combat entry, an 
incumbent firm lowers its price below its marginal costs.  It continues this practice until it drives 
its rival out of business.  Once its rival has exited, the incumbent raises its prices to the pre-entry 
level. 
 
Predatory pricing is a very old story in antitrust.  But proving a predation case can be 
remarkably difficult. 
 
While predation as a strategy may have a certain intuitive appeal, a hypothesized predator 
must face several difficulties.162 First, in lowering its own price it lowers its revenues and profits 
on its pre-predation volume.  Lowering price also increases the demand by consumers in the 
market.  Since selling below cost is a usual precondition for predation, increasing demand 
increases the predator’s losses.   In addition, lowering price will cause the intended victim to 
reduce its output, increasing demand (and therefore losses) for the predator’s product.   Putting 
these three elements together imply that the predator’s losses through a predatory strategy are 
likely to be far in excess of the victim’s losses.  
 
162 See, for example, Bork, “Injury to Competition: The Law’s Basic Theories,” in The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy 
at War with Itself, Chapter 7, New York: The Free Press, 134-59 (1978), and the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brooke Group, 509 U.S. 209, 224-5 (1993) 
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The predator faces an additional problem.  The fewer barriers to exit there are for the 
victim, the easier it will be for the predator to induce the victim to leave the market.  Exit barriers 
are usually considered to be “sunk costs,” costs of investment that cannot be recouped upon exit.  
But for predation to be profitable, the predator must be able to make supra-competitive profits 
after the predatory period is over.  This in turn implies that no new firms will enter in response to 
the post-predation high prices, which in turn implies significant barriers to entry.  However, 
barriers to entry are generally thought of as sunk costs, which make them identical to barriers to 
exit.   
 
For example, the importance of barriers to entry assume that an independent entrepreneur 
with only limited financial resources decides to enter into the operation of a gasoline station.  
That entrepreneur is able to overcome to relevant barriers to entry, which appear to deal with 
obtaining an appropriate site, an environmental permit for the site, and an environmentally 
appropriate storage tank for the gasoline.  Now assume that once that operator enters business, it 
is the target of a predatory strategy by a larger firm.   Such a strategy may well drive this 
operator out of business, but that does not imply that such a strategy is profitable for the 
predator. 
 
The difficulty for the predation strategy arises because causing a particular operator to 
stop operating a particular station is not the same as preventing that station from operating.  The 
assets of a station are likely to still exist, even if a particular operator has left the business, and 
may well be owned by the creditor of the operator, such as a bank.  Once the predator raises 
price to capture its profits, the creditor has important incentives to sell the property to another, 
perhaps better financed entity, and have the property reenter operation as a gasoline station.  
 
In particular, the theory of predatory pricing implies is that a successful predator desires 
an industry with significant barriers to entry, but insignificant barriers to exit.  Such a situation 
may occur only rarely, but may well apply to commodity exchanges.  As discussed above, the 
most useful way for an entrant exchange to gain customers is to pay them to use that exchange.  
This represents a sunk cost that cannot be recouped should the new firm be forced to exit. 
 
In addition, a necessary condition for predation is market power in an appropriately 
defined antitrust market.  A prerequisite for market power is a high market share.163 As 
discussed above, if one commodity constitutes an antitrust market, this criterion is likely to be 
met. 
 
Legally, the Supreme Court’s 1993 Brooke Group164 decision lays out several elements 
of the relevant legal test.  First, the prices charged must be below marginal cost.165 This may be 
a difficult test to meet in commodity exchanges, where much of the cost is up-front, and only a 
small amount of cost is incurred per trade. 
 
163 See the Supreme Court decisions in Brooke Group Ltd v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., supra and 
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884 (1993). 
164 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 
165 Average variable cost is often used as a proxy for marginal cost, where average variable cost equals (total costs – 
fixed costs) divided by quantity produced. 
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In such circumstances, courts have been reluctant to support cases of predation.  For 
example, in the recent prominent case U.S. v. American Airlines,166 the Department of Justice 
alleged that American Airlines engaged in predatory pricing with respect to a variety of airline 
routes in and out of Dallas-Forth Worth.  For the purposes of predatory pricing cases, the airline 
industry is much like the commodity exchange industry, with high fixed costs and low marginal 
costs. 
 
The Justice Department argued that in determining marginal costs, “incremental” costs 
for flying a particular route should be included. The District Court rejected this argument as 
contrary to a large number of precedents with respect to measurement of costs.   
 
The Justice Department also contended that American Airlines was trying to create a 
“reputation” for predation, along the lines of recent theoretical work in economics.  According to 
this theory, if there is a even a small probability that instead of being profit maximizing a 
dominant firm “enjoys” predation, a “pooling equilibrium” may exist where profit-maximizing 
firms mimic the “irrational” firm and engage in predation.  In effect, the profit-maximizing firm 
“pretends” to be irrational and is thereby able to deter entry into its market.167 The District 
Court rejected this theory as largely speculative, stating. 
 
The problem with all such strategies is not that we doubt their existence or 
even their anticompetitive consequences. Rather, identifying them in the 
particular case without chilling aggressive, competitive pricing is far 
beyond the capacity of any antitrust tribunal. Once we cross the threshold 
and permit prices above cost to be condemned as predatory, we throw the 
doors open to all kinds of speculation about the pricing strategies of large 
firms -- speculation that judges ordinarily address by opening discovery, 
including evidence of presumed anticompetitive intent, and making a jury 
the final decision-maker. Antitrust begins with the premise that all firms, 
even dominant firms, are permitted to compete aggressively, and that hard 
competition is a desideratum rather than an evil. Thus prices above the 
relevant measure of cost become an absolute safe harbor.168 
Though it would be difficult, a predation case in the commodity industry can conceivable 
make some type of sense.  This industry has high barriers to entry where new firms are trying to 
gain an initial foothold. 
 
166 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kansas 2001) 
167 See Milgrom and Roberts, ‘Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (2), 
280-312 (1982). 
168 U.S. v. American Airlines (at 152-53)(italics original) 
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2.  Application III:  USFE v. CBOT/CME
USFE sued CBOT and CME for inter alia, predation in addition to its vertical theory.  
USFE asserted that immediately prior and during USFE’s entry into the treasury market, CBOT 
engaged in predatory pricing.  In particular, USFE asserts that CBOT changed its trading charges 
(execution fees) for electronic trading according to the following table 
 
Table 3169 
CBOT Changes in Treasury Futures Trading Charges Per Contract 
According to USFE Brief 
 
January 1, 2004 December 
31, 2003 Trades]
25,000/ 
month 
Trades^
25,000/ 
month 
February 
1, 2004 
February 
12, 2004 
Market 
Share 
Member’s 
Account with 
Member 
Trading 
$0.12 $0.10 $0.05 $0.00 $0.00 40.1% 
Member’s 
Account with 
Non-Member 
Trading 
$0.274 $0.30 $0.20 $0.06 $0.06 38.9% 
Non-Member’s 
Account 
$1.054 $0.90 $0.075 $0.30 $0.30 
Non-Member 
Leasing CBOT 
Seat 
NA NA NA $0.06 
21.0% 
While there are other factors possibly at play (such as clearing fees, membership fees, 
etc.) that will be raised in the litigation, the table above implies that CBOT lowered its average 
trading charges on Treasury futures from prices an average of $0.376 to $0.086, or slightly over 
77 percent. 
 
Of course, this information, by itself, is not sufficient to show predatory pricing.  The 
next relevant piece of information is the marginal cost to the exchange of trading.  It may well be 
that this cost is very low.  Exchanges could be like airlines, in that the marginal cost of providing 
service is small compared to the capital cost.  If so, the teaching of the American Airlines case 
implies that winning a predatory pricing case in the commodity exchange industry could be quite 
difficult. 
 
However, there are some perhaps interesting facts (for a predation theory) in this case. 
The following chronology details these allegations: 
 
169 (May 10, 2004 brief at 9) 
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• On February 3, 2004, knowing that USFE would be approved within days, CBO 
announced new preemptive cuts in its electronic transaction fees for U.S. Treasury 
futures and options, retroactive to February 1, 2004.  Notably, the CBOT did not 
introduce similar price cuts in its non-electronic trading services for these products, 
which Eurex U.S. did not offer. 
 
• On February 12, 2004, after USFE had been available as a competitive alternative to 
CBOT’s monopoly for one week (and Eurex US had decent numbers in its treasury 
market in terms of percentage of trades), CBOT announced a further price cut. 
 
• At the time of these price cuts, the Chairman of the CBOT, Charles Carey, wrote a letter 
to the members of the CBOT informing them that the price cut would be reviewed in 6 
months and was likely temporary.170 
• USFE had some success with the treasury product during the late summer/early fall of 
2004 due, in large part, to an aggressive incentive program dubbed the “Liquidity 
Initiative.”  As the heart of the USFE Liquidity Initiative was expiring in December 2004 
and USFE was beginning to lose market share, CBOT announced a price increase in its 
Treasury products. 
 
• By June 2005, USFE’s market share in the Treasury products was less than 1 percent on a 
daily basis.  As such, USFE declared the war for the Treasuries over and indicated that it 
would no longer support the product, but it would keep it listed.  Approximately two 
months later, CBOT announced a significant price increase in its Treasury products.171 
These factors might seem to imply predatory intent on the part of CBOT.  On the other hand, 
CBOT could argue that it was simply reacting to the emergence, and later the ending, of new 
competition and setting its prices according.  In addition, CBOT will likely argue that, despite 
the fact that it was charging $0 for trading to a significant percent of the market at the time USFE 
was attempting to initially compete in the market (approximately 40 percent did not pay any 
execution fees), it was still not charging below costs.  Moreover, CBOT will likely argue that 
there are product substitutes for Treasury futures, such as the over-the-counter market, i.e., the 
unregulated derivative market. 
 
However, as noted above, proving predation under the antitrust laws – even in a fairly 
clear-cut case – is a difficult proposition.  In any event, the case – should it proceed to summary 
judgment and/or a trial – will provide interesting, and perhaps groundbreaking insights into the 
law of predation. 
 
170 David Roeder, Eurex snags 6-8% or market 1st day, Chicago Sun-Times at 53 (February 10, 2004); Jeremy 
Grant, New exchange shakes up pricing: Eurex has made waves and CBOT, with its higher cost base, is at a 
disadvantage, Financial Times at 33 (February 4, 2004) 
171 Andrei Postelnicu, CBOT lifts fees for US Treasury contracts Financial Times at 20 (August 30, 2005); see also 
Testimony of John Damgard before the Senate Banking Committee (September 8, 2005). 
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C. Essential Facility or “Duty to Deal” Cases 
 
1. Theory 
 
In a broken and arguably inconsistent line of cases dating back to Terminal Railroad,172 
the Supreme Court and lower courts have asserted that firms with market power can have a duty 
to deal with their fledgling competitors, allowing such competitors to use their rivals’ “essential 
facilities.”173 These, however, cases have been subject to a large degree of criticism in the 
academic literature. 
 
The basic economic theory behind the essential facilities doctrine is that the relevant firm 
is “leveraging” its monopoly from one market into another, vertically related market.  But 
leveraging is not a recognized concept in economics. Economic theory points out that in the 
vertical chain for a product there exists one and only one monopoly profit.  A firm can gain that 
profit by monopolizing any part of the production chain.  Thus, if a firm has market power at one 
stage of production, it cannot increase that power by gaining a monopoly at another stage of 
production.174 
The most important recent essential facilities case is Aspen Skiing Co.  vs. Aspen 
Highlands Skiing Corp.175 In this matter, the Aspen Ski Corporation controlled three of the four 
skiing mountains in Aspen, Colorado.  The fourth mountain was controlled by the Aspen 
Highland Corporation.   The two relevant firms entered into an agreement for a joint ski ticket, 
which clearly reduced transactions costs for skiing consumers.  After the initial agreement 
lapsed, the Aspen Ski refused various entreaties from Aspen Highland to extend the agreement. 
 
Aspen Highland sued Aspen Ski on antitrust grounds, and the Supreme Court found for 
the plaintiff.  Viewing the joint agreement as clearly in consumers’ interest, the Supreme Court 
ordered it continued. 
 
There are many critiques one can make of Aspen Ski.176 For example, a rule that requires 
firms to extend agreements they have made with their rivals discourages such agreements from 
being entered into in the first place.  In addition, it is not clear at all how courts should generally 
 
172 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
173 Lower courts and commentators often call this the “essential facilities doctrine,” though the Supreme Court has
repeatedly eschewed such a direct formulation.
174 Criticism of leveraging generally extends to the essential facilities doctrine because "the rationale of the essential
facility doctrine is exactly the same as that of the leveraging cases." Gregory J. Werden, The Law and Economics of
the Essential Facility Doctrine, 32 St. Louis U. L.J. 433, 460 (1987); David Reiffen & Andrew N. Kleit, Terminal
Railroad Revisited: Foreclosure of an Essential Facility or Simple Horizontal Monopoly?, 33 J.L. & Econ. 419, 420-
21 (1990) ("[E]conomic theory suggest[s] that there is no need for an essential facilities doctrine, as firms do not
have anticompetitive reasons to deny access.");. IIIA Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An
Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application 174 (1996) ("[C]onsumers are no better off when a monopoly
is shared; ordinarily, price and output are the same as they were when one monopolist used the input alone."); Blue
Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1413 (7th Cir. 1995).
175 472 U.S. 585 (1985) 
176 See Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 Notre Dame Law. Review 972 (1986). 
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set remedies in such cases. 177 Perhaps continuing the agreement in Aspen Ski made sense, at 
least for some time.  But in a dynamic economy, how can a court regulate an economic 
agreement between firms?  Antitrust courts are not regulators.  They do not generally set prices 
or conditions.178 
Perhaps in response to this criticism, the Supreme Court significantly reduced the legal 
scope of the duty to deal in the recent Trinko 540 U.S. 124 (2004) matter.  In Trinko, the Court 
indicated that the essential facilities doctrine could not be used to require a duty to deal if either 
1) there had not been a prior contract between the parties on the relevant point (as in Aspen Ski), 
or 2) there was a regulatory agency that could, as part of its regulatory mission, require and 
directly regulate such a relationship. 
 
2. Application IV:  ICE v. NYMEX
A host of issues were raised in the recently decided ICE v. NYMEX case.  NYMEX 
operated the only commodity exchanges in natural gas (based on Henry Hub, Louisiana) and oil 
(West Texas Intermediate, based on Cushing, Oklahoma).  ICE attempted, in various ways, to 
compete with NYMEX in these products.  After its initial attempts in this market, ICE decided 
that it need to offer its customers clearing services to become competitive. In particular, ICE 
believed it needed to offer its customers “marking to market” services, as discussed in Section II. 
 
Marking to market requires final closing prices, and that was the major bone of 
contention in the ICE/NYMEX matter.  ICE original offered an “over-the-counter” trading 
platform in oil and natural gas.  On this platform, parties “met” and traded products.  Clearing 
and delivery issues were, however, left to the contracting parties.  ICE decided to expand its 
operations by operating clearing services for the contracting parties.  Such services, however, 
required end of day prices. 
 
For clearinghouse services to be the most efficient, they require the most accurate end of 
day prices.  ICE could have used its own prices.  But, as the upstart exchange, ICE had less 
trading, a less liquid exchange, and therefore less accurate closing prices.  ICE desired to use 
NYMEX’s closing price for its settlement purposes, and NYMEX refused. 
 
While the details are involved, there is a long history of the property rights aspects of 
market prices. In short, the law is that prices belong to the exchanges that generate them, though 
with reporting requirements discussed below.179 Thus, under basic contract law NYMEX could 
deny ICE access to these prices. 
 
ICE’s plea for relief was a combination of essential facilities and vertical restraint 
theories.  ICE asserted that NYMEX’s prices were “essential” to the operation of its rival trading 
 
177 See for example, Lopatka and Page, "Devising a Microsoft Remedy that Serves Consumers," George Mason Law 
Review 9:3 (2001) 691. 
178 Another difficulty with Aspen Ski is the market definition, which was the self-contradictory “destination skiing in 
Aspen.” 
179 See  Mulherin, Netter, and Overdahl, "Prices are Property: The Organization of Financial Exchanges from a 
Transaction Cost Perspective," Journal of Law & Economics (1991). 
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platform.  By itself, as discussed above, this would do nothing to create competition in the 
relevant market.  NYMEX could simply charge ICE the relevant monopoly premium. 
 
ICE, however, also asserted that allowing it access to NYMEX’s prices would strengthen 
its own exchange.    Thus, ICE’s theory was that, given access to NYMEX’s prices, ICE’s 
exchange would increase in volume and develop higher quality closing prices.  This, in turn, 
would eliminate ICE’s need to use NYMEX’s prices. 
 
In a summary judgment ruling, the District Court focused on ICE’s essential facilities 
claim.   In its first argument, citing Trinko, the court noted that an essential facilities claim 
should be denied when a “federal agency has effective power to compel sharing and regulate its 
scope and term.”  The court then asserted that the CFTC had this power.  This conclusion is far 
from clear. 
 
In its core principles, the CFTC has the right to compel exchanges to release information, 
without charge, to the public.  But this compulsion has two important limitations.  First, 
exchanges are not required to release information in a timely manner.  Thus, many exchanges 
will sell a premium information service that provides “real time” information, while releasing 
information for free that is twenty minutes old.  Second, exchanges can limit the use of their 
information in commercial parties that are sold, in one form or another, to third parties.  Thus, it 
is not certain that the CFTC has the ability to force the sale of time-sensitive information for use 
by third parties. 
 
The CFTC’s core principles also require it to evaluate antitrust issues in commodity 
exchanges.  But even together with its principles on releasing information, it is far from clear if 
the CFTC could compel release of the information at issue in ICE/NYMEX.  Even if the CFTC 
had that power, it is unclear what rates the CFTC would impose on the transaction.  The CFTC 
has never imposed rate regulation on any products, and it is not clear how it would do so, even if 
it had the authority.  As with most information products, the marginal cost of supplying 
information to outside parties is close to zero.  The costs of providing information are largely in 
up-front capital expenses, as well as the risk of product failure. Thus, cost of service regulation, 
as is done by state regulatory commissions and the Federal Communications Commission, would 
not be appropriate to this question.   
 
The court was on firmer ground in its second argument.  The essential facilities test in 
Aspen Ski that did survive the Trinko decision is the rule that a prior contractual relationship is a 
sign of an economically efficient relationship. Unlike Aspen, ICE was not seeking to renew a 
previous sharing agreement with NYMEX.  Thus, its claim was flawed.  In a complementary 
argument, the court also noted that NYMEX has an efficiency reason not to deal with ICE – to 
prevent ICE from free-riding on its price-generating operations. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
The rise of competition in commodity exchanges also brings with it antitrust 
enforcement.  Where this enforcement will take place, however, is unclear.  Courts will be 
challenged to articulate a logical theory of antitrust immunity that allows administrative agencies 
to carry out their regulatory missions while still allowing parties their day in court. 
 
As shown in recent cases, antitrust principles can be applied to antitrust disputes between 
and among commodity exchanges.  While regulatory agencies may wish to set their own 
policies, there is no obvious need for such an event.  Indeed, as the CME/LIFFE matter shows, 
regulatory agencies may not be in a position to grant aggrieved firms effective relief.  Thus, 
courts should be reluctant to grant parties antitrust immunity. 
